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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2012, the United States House of Representatives (“House”), by
a vote of 255–67, held then-Attorney General Eric Holder in criminal contempt for
refusing to turn over subpoenaed records bearing on an Obama-era law
enforcement operation entitled “Fast and Furious.” This was the first time in
United States history that the highest law enforcement officer in the land had ever
been held in criminal contempt. But it would not be the last.
On July 17, 2019, the House, by a vote of 230–198 held then-Attorney General
William Barr and former Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, Jr. in criminal
contempt for failing to disclose subpoenaed records pertaining to the Donald
Trump Administration’s effort to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census.
While the actions holding each former Attorney General and the Commerce
Secretary in criminal contempt for failing to disclose information subpoenaed by
Congress represented historical firsts, these were not the first instances in which
information was withheld by the executive branch based on a claim of executive
privilege. In fact, from the time of the George Washington administration to the
Donald Trump administration, at least thirty-seven presidents have refused to
disclose records requested by Congress. Frequently, the reason given by the
President or by those whom the President ordered to respond to the Congressional
request on his behalf was the same as that claimed by Holder and Barr—executive
privilege.
However, it was not until 1983 that the full House voted to hold an executive
branch official—Anne Burford, then-Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency—in criminal contempt.1
One would naturally think that Congress has developed and employed
effective remedies in response to the long history of the executive branch’s
invocation of executive privilege and its concomitant refusal to disclose

1. Morton Rosenberg & Todd B. Tatelman, CONG RSCH. SERV., CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER: LAW,
HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE, RL34097, 26–27 n.157, 31 (2008). However, Administrator Burford was
not prosecuted because an agreement was reached under which Congress was granted access to the documents
that had been withheld under a claim of executive privilege. Id. at 24 n.142.
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information requested by Congress regardless of which political party occupies the
White House. While a reasonable assumption to make, it is an erroneous one.
Several potential solutions covering a wide and varying spectrum have been
proposed to respond to this ongoing and vexing issue each suffering from different
infirmities. Remedies used to respond to executive branch non-compliance with
Congressional subpoenas include the following: (1) reinstituting Congress’ use of
its inherent criminal contempt power; (2) enforcing criminal contempt under 2
U.S.C. § 194; and (3) seeking civil enforcement under 28 U.S.C. § 1365.2
Following a discussion of each of these alternatives and analyzing their
deficiencies, this Article will suggest a workable alternative. For almost seventy
years, Congress has attempted to address the problem of executive branch
reluctance to comply with Congressional subpoenas. Congress’ use of contempt
resolutions has proven ineffective because the action necessary to resolve the
impasse depends upon Congress taking the next step, and Congress has generally
been unwilling or unable to take it. To overcome this reluctance, this Article
proposes that Congress adopt a statute enabling private, non-profit, tax-exempt
organizations to pick up the gauntlet after Congress has adopted a contempt
resolution when the executive branch has refused to comply with a subpoena—
asserting executive privilege. The organization would be required to be designated
as a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) [hereafter § 501(c)(3)] organization and have as one of
its chartered purposes the monitoring of executive branch compliance with
Congressionally authorized subpoenas for information or testimony, or both.
The statute would permit an organization to seek from the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, on an expedited basis, a declaratory
judgement and obtain injunctive relief against the offending party. If the offending
party fails to comply with the court’s order, the court could then find it in contempt
and impose appropriate sanctions.
However, the major obstacle to this alternative (other than the obvious political
one discussed below) is the question of standing. This Article will discuss the
principal cases in which the courts have found that an organization has
“informational standing” and analyze whether the reasoning employed in those
matters can be applied to the proposed statute to effectuate its successful
implementation.
In this way, Congressional intransigence may be overcome by essentially
vesting the responsibility for compelling executive branch compliance with the

2. A fourth solution is to do nothing. See Neal Devins, Congressional Process Symposium: CongressionalExecutive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal – Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110, 119
(1996) (“This essay therefore argues that, whatever its faults, the current system is far better than reform proposals
that would create a judicial end point to conflicts that are now solved without judicial involvement.”) While it is
true that some conflicts between Congress and the executive branch arising out of the President asserting
executive privilege in response to a Congressional subpoena are resolved through negotiation as maintained by
Professor Devins, such negotiation efforts did not resolve the Holder and the Barr/Ross contempt matters. See
infra Part II.
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organizations which have the greatest vested interest in achieving it—while
minimizing the political obstacles that have beset prior efforts.
This Article has five parts. Part II discusses the background of the contempt
resolutions passed by Congress in response to the refusals by Attorney Generals
Holder and Barr and Commerce Secretary Ross to turn over subpoenaed
documents. Part III briefly examines the invocation of executive privilege by past
Presidential administrations in response to Congressional efforts to obtain
information dating back to George Washington. Part IV addresses the three
principal alternatives available to Congress in responding to executive branch
intransigence and discusses their deficiencies. Part V proposes a draft statute that
will overcome the deficiencies of the current alternatives that have failed to compel
executive branch compliance with Congressional subpoenas after Congress has
approved a contempt resolution. This part will also illustrate how this proposal will
address the inadequacies of the current approaches employed by Congress. Part VI
presents a summary and conclusion.
II. CONTEMPT RESOLUTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY GENERALS ERIC HOLDER AND
WILLIAM BARR
A. Eric Holder
In his role as United States Attorney General in the Obama administration,
Holder was responsible for overseeing the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
including, among many other responsibilities, law enforcement investigations
conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms (“ATF”).3 One such
program was the ill-fated effort known as “Fast and Furious,” the purpose of which
was to “confront the suspected illegal flow of firearms from the United States to
drug cartels in Mexico.”4
In this program, ATF agents “knowingly allowed firearms purchased illegally
in the United States to be unlawfully transferred to third parties and transported
into Mexico.”5 The ATF’s goal was to follow the flow of the weapons into the
hands of the Mexican drug cartels that had purchased them.6 The program gained
notoriety when a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agent named Brian Terry
was killed in a firefight with cartel criminals on December 15, 2010, and guns
acquired through “Fast and Furious” were recovered at the scene.7

3. ATF was renamed in 2003 to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, but will be
referred to in this Article as ATF. Dan Eggen, Move to Justice Dept. Brings ATF New Focus, WASH. POST, (Jan.
23, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/01/23/move-to-justice-dept-brings-atf-newfocus/76f43384-a848-4dec-9490-29dd2a2ade6c/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
4. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013).
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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As a result of this incident, the House of Representatives’ Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform (“the Committee”) launched an investigation
which began initially as an effort to obtain information about the tactics used by
the ATF in carrying out “Fast and Furious.” The investigation was stymied at the
outset by an absolute denial by the DOJ that such an operation was ever carried
out. “The allegation . . . that [the ATF] ‘sanctioned’ or otherwise knowingly
allowed the sale of assault weapons to a straw purchaser who then transported them
into Mexico—is false. The ATF makes every effort to interdict weapons that have
been purchased illegally and prevent their transportation to Mexico.”8
This representation was false and acknowledged as such on December 2, 2011
when the DOJ withdrew its February 4, 2011 letter.9 Between the initial February
letter and its withdrawal ten months later, the following events transpired: the DOJ
Inspector General initiated an investigation of the allegations raised in Senator
Grassley’s January inquiry; the Committee issued an initial subpoena for
documents about “Fast and Furious;” the DOJ conceded that it had allowed some
guns “to walk” during the operation; and the DOJ provided some 2,000 pages of
discovery to the Committee but withheld investigative reports and grand jury
material.10 In October 2011, the DOJ stated it had “substantially concluded its
efforts to respond to the initial subpoena.”11
At this juncture, the Committee’s suspicions increased and its interest in “Fast
and Furious” intensified, resulting in the issuance of a second subpoena—this time
to the Attorney General himself. The second subpoena requested documents
regarding any instances prior to February 4, 2011 (the date of the first DOJ letter
denying allegations of impropriety in the “Fast and Furious” investigation) where
the ATF had failed to interdict weapons; all investigative reports—none of which
had been disclosed in response to the Committee’s first subpoena; and documents
dated after February 4, 2011.12 While thousands of pages of subpoenaed
documents were produced in response to the second subpoena, the Attorney
General did not produce any documents dated after February 4, 2011.13
As a result, the Committee and the DOJ negotiated in an effort to resolve the
impasse.14 While the Committee offered to narrow the scope of the subpoena,
Committee Chairman Issa also proposed holding AG Holder in contempt.15
Finally, on the day of the scheduled contempt hearing and with no resolution
having been achieved, President Barack Obama invoked executive privilege
8. Id. (citing a letter dated February 4, 2011, from then-Assistant Attorney General Ronald Welch to
Senator Grassley that was sent in response to Senator Grassley’s initial inquiry that was begun in January 2011,
and that was prompted by press accounts of the murder of Agent Terry).
9. Id. at 6.
10. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 979 F. Supp. at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5–6.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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claiming that executive branch deliberations would be impaired by compliance and
would be “inconsistent” with the separation of powers.16
On June 20, 2012, the Committee voted 23–17 to hold the AG in contempt of
Congress, and on June 28, 2012, the full House voted 255–67 adopted House
Resolution 711 holding the AG in contempt.17
The United States Code makes contumacious conduct before Congress a crime
and prescribes required actions to be taken following the adoption of a contempt
resolution. Title 2 U.S.C. § 192 makes it a misdemeanor for any person who has
been summoned as a witness to give testimony or to produce papers upon any
matter under inquiry by either House of Congress and who either fails to appear or
fails to answer questions.18
Under 2 U.S.C. § 194, once Congress adopts a contempt resolution, the matter
is referred to the United States Attorney (“USA”) for the District of Columbia
“whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.”19
As mandated by 2 U.S.C. § 192, the Speaker of the House certified the
contempt resolution to the USA for the District of Columbia on June 29, 2012.20
In response to the certification, the USA for the District of Columbia refused to
initiate a criminal prosecution against AG Holder.21
Following the USA’s declination of prosecution against AG Holder, the
Speaker of the House authorized the General Counsel of the House to file a lawsuit

16. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 979 F. Supp. at 6.
17. Id. at 7.
18. 2 U.S.C. § 192 provides that:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress
to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint
committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any
committee of either House of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes
default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under
inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor
less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve
months.
Id.
19. § 194 states that:
Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 of this title, fails to appear to testify or
fails to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, as required, or whenever any witness so
summoned refuses to answer any questions pertinent to the subject under inquiry before either House,
or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress,
or any committee or subcommittee of either House of Congress, and the fact of such failure or failures
is reported to either House while Congress is in session, or when Congress is not in session, a statement
of fact constituting such failure is reported to and filed with the President of the Senate or the Speaker
of the House, it shall be the duty of the said President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House, as
the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify, the statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of
the Senate or House, as the case may be, to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall
be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.
Id.
20. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 979 F. Supp. at 7.
21. Id.
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to enforce its subpoena.22 The DOJ filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on the
following claims: (1) The Committee lacks standing; (2) The court does not have
jurisdiction to try it; and (3) Even if the court finds that the Committee has standing
and that the District Court has jurisdiction, the court should exercise its discretion
and decline to hear it.23
The DOJ argued that even if the House had standing to bring its action, the
court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. The DOJ claimed that the House’s reliance on
the Declaratory Judgment Act was insufficient to state a cause of action.24 The
District Court acknowledged that the Declaratory Judgment Act alone does not
confer jurisdiction without valid grounds independent of the Act. However, the
court found that compliance with Article III, section 2 of the Constitution—
limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear and decide only cases or
controversies—is satisfied by Article I. “It is well-established that the Committee’s
power to investigate and its right to further an investigation by issuing subpoenas
and enforcing them in court, derives from the legislative function assigned to
Congress in Article I of the Constitution.”25 The District Court denied the DOJ’s
motion to dismiss.26
Of the three elements of standing—injury in fact, causation, and
redressability—the court focused on injury-in-fact, while noting that all three
constitute “an essential predicate to the exercise of jurisdiction.27 The required
injury-in-fact must represent “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.”28 The court found that such an injury-in-fact was demonstrated since
“a legislative body suffers a redressable injury when that body cannot receive
information necessary to carry out its constitutional responsibilities. This right to
receive information arises primarily in subpoena enforcement cases, where a house
of Congress or a congressional committee seeks to compel information in aid of
its legislative function.”29
22. Id.
23. Id. at 17. This Article will not address whether the District Court should have exercised its discretion
in declining to hear the matter. The relevance of this case to this Article is to show that futility of Congress’s
action in seeking to enforce its subpoena through the courts when, even upon prevailing, the DOJ can simply “run
out the clock” which is precisely what happened here. However, the District Court’s analysis of standing and
jurisdiction requires discussion and analysis because the application of its analysis bears directly on the legislative
proposal made here to overcome executive branch intransigence.
24. Id. at 22; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . .any
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”).
25. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 979 F. Supp. at 22.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 505 U.S. 554, 560 (1992)).
29. U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dept. of Com., 11 F. Supp. 2d. 76, 86–96 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding
that the plan of the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of the Census to employ statistical sampling in the
2000 census to supplement the headcount enumeration used to apportion representatives among the states violates
the Census Act and that the House of Representatives has standing to challenge the plan).
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Despite the denial of the motion to dismiss, AG Holder did not provide any
post-February 4, 2011, documents that had been subpoenaed by Congress, and the
Obama administration ended before any other action compelling disclosure could
be taken.
B. William Barr
On March 26, 2018, former Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, Jr.,
announced that he was adding a citizenship question to the 2020 census.30
Secretary Ross claimed that on December 12, 2017, the DOJ had requested that
the citizenship question be added to assist in enforcing the Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”). Secretary Ross testified that he was adding the question “solely” at the
DOJ’s request.31
Some background information is necessary to understand why the opposition
to interposing the citizenship question on the 2020 census was so intense and why
suspicions about the motivation for the change were so great. Historically, there
have been twenty-three decennial censuses from 1790 to 2010, and each census
between 1820 and 2000 (with the exception of 1840), asked at least a portion of
the population about their citizenship or place of birth.32 Between 1820 and 1950,
a citizenship question was asked of all households.33 Between 1960 and 2000, in
an effort to simplify the census, only a few basic demographic questions were
asked on a short-form questionnaire, while more detailed questions, including the
citizenship question, were asked on a longer-form questionnaire which was
administered to about one quarter to one sixth of the population.34 The government
asserted that the need for asking the citizenship question on the short-form
questionnaire was obviated by the availability of that information from a different
source as a result of a recent statutory change requiring annual alien registration.35

30. Letter from Sec’y Wilbur Ross, Jr., Dep’t of Com., to Karen Dunn Kelley, Under Sec’y for Econ. Aff.,
Dep’t of Com. (Mar. 26, 2018) www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 4426785-commerce2018-03-26-2.html) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review). The Constitution requires an “Enumeration” of the population
every ten years, to be conducted in “such Manner” as Congress “shall by law direct.” Dep’t of Com. v. New York,
139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2019) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, § 2). In the Census
Act, Congress delegated to the Secretary of Commerce, the responsibility of conducing the census “in such form
and content as he may determine.” See 13 U.S.C. § 141(a).
31. Carolyn B. Maloney, Acting Chairwoman, Memorandum on Investigation of Census Citizenship
Question Since House Held Attorney General Barr and Commerce Secretary Ross in Contempt of Congress,
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM 1, 4 (Nov. 12, 2019), (Maloney Memorandum),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2019-1112.Memo%20to%20COR%20Members%20re.%20Census.pdf. [hereinafter Maloney Memorandum] (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing FY19 Budget Hearing: Department of Commerce: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies,
115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2018)).
32. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2561.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2561–2562.
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For the 2010 census, the format changed again.36 More detailed information—
including the citizenship question—rather than being included on the long-form
questionnaire, was instead asked in the American Community Survey which is sent
each year to a rotating sample of about 2.6% of households.37
There was substantial opposition from current Census Bureau staff and former
Bureau officials to resuming the asking of a citizenship question of all
households.38 The basis for the opposition was the perception that asking the
citizenship question would discourage non-citizens from answering, leading to an
inaccurate count of the population.39 An inaccurate count of the population could
affect the balance of power in the Congress and the amount of federal money
allocated to the States since census results are the basis for apportioning
representatives, allocate federal funds to the States, and to draw electoral
districts.40
The day after Secretary Ross announced his decision to include a citizenship
question on the 2020 census, Congress, launched a series of investigative efforts
to determine the reasons why this change was being made.41 These investigative
efforts included letters submitted the day after Secretary Ross’s announcement
requesting information that were sent both to the Department of Commerce and
DOJ; and additional requests were submitted in April, May, June, and August
2018.42 All of these inquiries bore on Secretary Ross’s initial testimony before
Congress that the citizenship question was added solely at the DOJ’s request and
for the purpose of assisting in enforcement of the VRA.43 Neither Department
produced any documents responsive to the Congressional requests.44
When Democrats took control of the House in 2019, additional requests were
made for documents from both the Department of Commerce and DOJ early in
2019.45 After months of the executive branch stonewalling, the Committee issued
subpoenas to compel AG Barr and Secretary Ross to produce key documents.46
The documents were not produced, and on June 12, 2019 the Committee voted on
a bipartisan basis to hold both AG Barr and Secretary Ross in contempt of
Congress for withholding the subpoenaed documents.47 On the same day, President
Trump asserted executive privilege over each of the key documents identified in

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 2562.
Id.
Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2561–62.
Id.
Id. at 2561.
See Maloney Memorandum, supra note 31, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maloney Memorandum, supra note 31, at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
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the Committee’s subpoenas.48 Additionally, the President made a “protective
assertion of executive privilege” over all other documents responsive to the
Committee’s subpoenas.49
Congress conducted its investigation into the planned addition of a citizenship
question to the 2020 census contemporaneously with two lawsuits filed in Federal
District Court in New York challenging Secretary Ross’s decision.50On June 27,
2019, the USSC held that Secretary Ross could not add the citizenship question.
The Court found that “the evidence tells a story that does not match the explanation
the Secretary gave for his decision” and that “the VRA enforcement rationale—
the sole stated reason—seems to have been contrived.”51
There were two principal bases for the Court’s conclusion that Secretary
Ross’s prior testimony seemed contrived. First, while he had testified that he
agreed to add the citizenship question at the DOJ’s request, the record undermines
his claim. As the Court found:
Among those materials were emails and other records confirming that the
Secretary and his staff began exploring the possibility of reinstating a citizenship
question shortly after he was confirmed in early 2017, attempted to elicit requests
for citizenship data from other agencies, and eventually persuaded DOJ to request
reinstatement of the question for VRA enforcement purposes.52
Second, the Court found that while the Secretary’s initial steps to reinstate a
citizenship question began “about a week into his tenure, but it contains no hint
that he was considering VRA enforcement in connection with that project.”53
Given that Secretary Ross’s testimony was completely inconsistent with
indisputable portions of the record as found by the high court, the Committee
developed the belief that the Trump Administration had a nefarious motive in
adding the citizenship question to the 2020 census—to exclude immigrants for
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5–6.
50. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2562–63. The first suit was filed by eighteen states, the District of
Columbia, a number of counties and towns and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. That suit raised two claims: that
the decision violated the Enumeration Clause of the Constitution and that it violated the Administrative Procedure
Act. Id. The second suit was filed by a group of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and added an equal
protection claim to the litigation. Id. The District Court dismissed the Enumeration Clause claim but allowed the
other claims to proceed. Id. at 2564. Ultimately, the District Court ruled that Secretary Ross’s actions were
“arbitrary and capricious, based on a pretextual rationale and violated certain provisions of the Census Act.” Id.
However, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden on the equal protection claim to show that
Secretary Ross was “motivated by discriminatory animus.” Id. The District Court “granted judgment to the
plaintiffs on their statutory claim, vacated the Secretary’s decision, and enjoined him from reinstating the
citizenship question until he cured the legal errors the court had identified.” Id. 2564–2565. While the Government
appealed to the Second Circuit, it also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted, seeking
immediate and direct review given the timing constraints for the printing of the census questionnaire and the fact
that the issue was one of “imperative public importance.” Id. at 2565. The Supreme Court also revived the
Enumeration Clause claim requesting the parties to address whether it would provide an alternative basis to affirm.
Id.
51. Id. at 2575.
52. Id. at 2564.
53. Id. at 2575.
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purposes of legislative redistricting and apportionment.54 The Trump
Administration’s continued refusal to turn over subpoenaed documents fortified
that belief. The Committee’s suspicions formed the primary motivating factor in
the continued Congressional efforts to obtain the subpoenaed documents. The
Committee’s failure to acquire them led the House on July 17, 2019 to adopt
resolutions holding both AG Barr and Secretary Ross in criminal contempt of
Congress for failing to produce subpoenaed documents. H. Res. 497, 116th Cong.
(2019).
On July 24, 2019, Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen wrote a letter to
Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in which he informed her
of the DOJ’s decision not to bring the congressional contempt citations before a
grand jury or take any other action to prosecute the Attorney General or the
Secretary.55
Both in the Holder and the Barr/Ross proceedings, Congress subpoenaed
records; the President invoked executive privilege through his respective Attorney
General; Congress held the Attorney General in contempt of Congress for noncompliance with the subpoenas; and no records responsive to the subpoenas were
ever produced. While these incidents present perhaps the most palpable and
extreme examples of contumacious conduct by the executive branch, they are not
the only instances of it. The following section examines prior instances in which
the President invoked executive privilege was in response to Congressional
subpoenas.
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INVOCATION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE BY THE
PRESIDENT
A. The Definition and Origin of Executive Privilege
The USSC has recognized executive privilege as a doctrine that applies under
two circumstances: (1) to protect the national security (confidential Presidential
communications privilege) and (2) to protect “the privacy of White House
deliberations (deliberative process privilege) when it is in the public interest to do
so.”56

54. See Maloney Memorandum, supra note 31, at 9.
55. Nicholas Wu, Justice Department Won’t Prosecute Barr and Ross After House Voted to Hold Them in
Contempt, USA TODAY (July 25, 2019 9:18 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ politics/2019/07/25/
census-justice-department-declines-act-house-contempt-vote/1824609001/ (containing a copy of Deputy
Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen’s letter).
56. Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L.
REVIEW 1069, 1070 (1999).
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1. National Security
The USSC addressed executive privilege in United States v. Nixon in which
the principal issue presented was whether the President’s invocation of executive
privilege was an absolute privilege that is unreviewable by the court.57 The court
ruled that it must accord great deference to the need that the President has “for
complete candor and objectivity from [his] advisers.”58 However, the court
cautioned that “absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
national security secrets,” the privilege is not absolute.59
2. Deliberative Process Communications
Similarly, just as national security communications must be protected, the
court recognized the broader rule that “a President and those who assist him must
be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately.”60
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the doctrine of executive privilege
does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.61 Moreover, the phrase “executive
privilege” was not coined until the administration of President Eisenhower.62
While the phrase “executive privilege” was not used until the 1950s, virtually
every Presidential administration since George Washington employed the concept
of executive privilege.63
As Professor Mark J. Rozell notes, the first instance in which the doctrine was
applied occurred when Congress requested from President Washington
information regarding a failed military expedition.64 Congress “requested White
House records and testimony from presidential staff familiar with the incident.”65
Relying on notes prepared by Thomas Jefferson, we learn that Washington sought

57. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
58. Id. at 706.
59. Id. (“[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from
judicial process under all circumstances.”); id. at 707 (“[t]o read the Art. II powers of the President as providing
an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes as no more than a
generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would
upset the constitutional balance of a ‘workable government’ and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art.
III.” Id. at 707. Consistent with its ruling that the Presidential privilege of immunity is not unqualified and
unreviewable, the USSC approved the district court’s in camera review of Congressionally subpoenaed material
for which the President had invoked executive privilege. Id. at 713–14.
60. Id. at 708.
61. Rozell, supra, note 56, at 1069.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1070.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 493 (1792)).
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the advice of his cabinet on the Congressional request.66 The cabinet unanimously
“agreed that a President has a right to withhold information when it is in the public
interest to do so.”67 Although Washington decided to comply with the
Congressional request, Professor Rozell opines that Washington “laid the
groundwork for later Presidents to claim executive privilege.”68
Additionally, Professor Rozell notes that on two other occasions Washington
refused to comply with Congressional requests for information, asserting that the
President has a right to secrecy in some instances.69 In those instances, Washington
maintained that concealing certain information was “justified by a need to protect
the public interest.”70
B. Invocation of Executive Privilege by the President
There have been a number of articles, studies, and cases analyzing the
frequency with which executive privilege has been invoked by the president and
the reasons cited for its invocation.71 The purpose of this section of the Article is
not to provide another analysis but simply to summarize the main findings of those
studies to illustrate that while not an everyday occurrence, executive privilege was
invoked by the vast majority of all presidential administrations. While the
Congressional requests made of Holder, Barr, and Ross—and their refusals to
comply with the subpoenas—represent perhaps the most extreme examples of
contumaciousness, they are far from the only ones.
1. Frequency of Executive Privilege Invocations
Of the forty-six Presidents elected since the founding of the Republic, thirtyseven invoked executive privilege (or its equivalent).72 In the past one hundred
years, every president has asserted executive privilege at least one time.73 The
frequency with which past Presidents have claimed executive privilege within the

66. Rozell, supra, note 56, at 1070 (citing PAUL FORD, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 189–190
(2009) (1892)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See generally Theodore B. Olson, History of Refusals by Executive Branch Officials to Provide
Information Demanded by Congress, 6 OFF. LEGAL. COUNS. 751 (1982) (summarizing invocations of executive
privilege from the administrations of George Washington through Ronald Reagan); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700, 705 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (summarizing invocations of executive privilege from the administrations of George
Washington through Harry Truman); Todd Garvey, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law,
Practice,
and
Recent
Developments,
CONG.
RSCH.
SERV.
1
(Dec.
15,
2014),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/secrecy/R42670.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Rozell, supra,
note 56, at 1069.
72. See generally Olson supra note 71; see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 705 n.9; see supra Part II.
73. See generally Olson supra note 71; see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 705 n.9; see supra Part II.
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last one hundred years ranges from a low of one invocation (Coolidge and Hoover)
to a high of forty-four times (Eisenhower).74
2. Reasons for the Invocation of Executive Privilege
The most frequently stated reason for the invocation of executive privilege was
that disclosure would not be in the public interest.75 Professor Rozell reasonably
implies that supporting the non-disclosure of requested documents because
disclosure would not be in the public interest is tantamount to claiming that
providing such information would jeopardize national security because it would
compromise the confidentiality of presidential communications.76
Example of some additional justifications by former presidents for the nondisclosure of Congressionally-requested information include the following: (1)
disclosure could jeopardize on-going treaty or other diplomatic negotiations
(Tyler’s refusal of Senate requests pertaining to the recognition of American
claims against Mexico and for information concerning a dispute with Great Britain
over the settlement of the Northwest Boundary);77 (2) complying with the request
would violate the confidentiality guarantees under which information was
provided to the President (Truman’s refusal to turn over to the House Committee
on Un-American Activities all loyalty files of executive branch employees);78 and
(3) providing the information sought by Congress would violate the separation of
powers (Cleveland’s denial of request for documents relating to the removal of the
U.S. Attorney (then District Attorney) for the Middle District of Alabama.)79
3. Motives for the Invocation of Executive Privilege
This Article has already described a variety of situations in which past
Presidents have invoked executive privilege. Determining why they invoked
executive privilege can be approached in two ways, and that determination may
shed some light on what may be characterized as the Janus-faced nature of
executive privilege.80 First, one may simply consider the reasons given for the
74. See id. at 769–70 (discussing the invocations of privilege from Presidents Coolidge and Hoover);
Ronald G. Shafer, Not Above the Law: Executive Privilege’s Contentious History from Washington to Trump,
WASH. POST (June 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/06/12/not-above-law-executiveprivileges-contentious-history-washington-trump/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing
President Eisenhower’s invocations of privilege).
75. See Olson, supra note 71 (indicating that at least sixteen Presidents invoked executive privilege
specifically on the ground that disclosure of requested information would not be in the public interest).
76. See MARK ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
146 (3d ed. 2010) (“Given the traditional standards for asserting executive privilege—protecting national security
or maintaining secrecy when it is in the public’s interest to do so. . . . :”).
77. See Olson supra note 71, at 760.
78. Id. at 771.
79. Id. at 767.
80. While Congress’s skepticism and suspicions about executive branch conduct continue to serve as a
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invocation, e.g., to maintain the confidentiality of treaty negotiations or to preserve
the separation of powers by keeping deliberative communications between the
President and his advisers confidential as described earlier. Second, determining
why a President invoked executive privilege may be gleaned from his motives.
However, it is difficult to determine motives. As Professor Dawn Johnson has
stated:
Although relevant, motive is extremely difficult to assess. Rarely will there be
direct evidence of congressional or presidential motive. Reliance on motive to
assess the legitimacy of particular requests for information or assertions of
privilege thus must be exercised with caution.81
Professor Johnson takes issue with Professor Rozell, whom she describes as
employing “a fundamentally misguided approach to executive privilege.”82 She
asserts that Professor Rozell sometimes attributes nefarious motives to the
invocation of executive privilege,83 and that he characterizes the attempts at
resolution of executive privilege claims with Congress in terms of wins and
losses.84 She juxtaposes Professor Rozell’s position with her own which
acknowledges and advocates for a process of trying to arrive at an accommodation
between Congress and the executive branch to resolve their disputes rather than
resorting at the outset to an invocation of executive privilege.85 Professor Johnson
contends that Presidents should invoke executive privilege in disputes with
Congress, “but they should do so only when absolutely necessary, only as a last
resort, typically late in the process.”86 She recommends that other executive branch
officials should first “seek to accommodate Congress’s legitimate needs and
exhaust alternatives, which requires (sic) them to express to Congress their
concerns about confidentiality in terms other than assertions of executive
privilege.”87 She argues that Congress, for its part, “should be respectful of” the
executive branch’s confidentiality concerns and “not demand that the President

legitimate basis for launching an investigation (e.g., Holder’s denial of the existence of “Fast and Furious” and
Ross’s and Barr’s claim that the citizenship question for the 2020 census was prompted by DOJ’s request) the
executive branch’s concern about Congress’s motivation in initiating an inquiry is legally irrelevant. See Eisler v.
United States, 170 F.2d 273, 278–79 (D.C. Cir.1948) (concluding that even if the motivation of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) in calling the defendant, an avowed Communist, to testify was to harass
him for his political beliefs, “the court has no authority to question the motives of Congress or one of its
committees.”). Highlighting the motives of Congress in conducting an investigation may have political appeal in
shaping public opinion, but that cannot defeat a Congressional investigation.
81. Dawn E. Johnson, Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation and
Accommodation, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1127, 1137 (1999).
82. Id. at 1139.
83. Id. at 1133 (“Rozell seems to suggest that an assertion of executive privilege is illegitimate where a
President is motivated by a concern that disclosure of information would prove embarrassing. He at times seems
to equate an effort to avoid embarrassment with an effort to hide evidence of executive branch wrongdoing.”).
84. Id. at 1139.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1137.
87. Johnson, supra note 81, at 1137.
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personally assert executive privilege where legislative needs do not outweigh
confidentiality concerns.”88
It seems clear from the wide spectrum of instances in which executive
privilege has been invoked by past Presidents that neither Professor Rozell’s nor
Professor Johnson’s analysis is accurate under all circumstances. On the one hand,
circumstances supporting the inference that executive privilege was invoked to
obfuscate executive branch wrongdoing are found in the criminal contempt
resolutions against Holder, Ross, and Barr.
Analysis of the record demonstrates that the criminal contempt resolutions
against Holder, Ross, and Barr were based on the mendaciousness of each.
Initially, Holder unequivocally denied that the ATF permitted the cross-border
delivery of illegal weapons to drug cartel members in a February 4, 2011 letter to
Congress. His absolute denial was completely undermined by DOJ’s December 2,
2011 letter withdrawing his initial denial. The lack of candor exhibited in the
submission of the February letter was reinforced by the DOJ’s continued refusal
to disclose the requested information even after Holder’s motion to dismiss was
denied.
Ross’s testimony that he only planned to add a citizenship question after he
was “asked” to do so by the DOJ was completely refuted by information uncovered
by Congress that it was Ross who asked the DOJ to make the request. The
continued refusal of Ross and Barr to comply with Congress’s request for
information about the citizenship question further supports the claim that the
assertion of executive privilege was invoked for an ulterior motive, particularly
after Ross’s testimony was thoroughly impeached.
On the other hand, there are many examples in which executive privilege was
invoked for reasons that seem beyond reproach and for which no ulterior motives
could be detected. Claims of executive privilege asserted during treaty negotiations
or other diplomatic tasks illustrate the well-intended use of executive privilege.
Of course, there is always a third possibility, that the President might invoke
executive privilege with mixed intentions. In this circumstance, the President’s
purpose in invoking executive privilege could be both to protect confidential
communications and/or deliberative communications and to avoid embarrassment
or the detection of wrongdoing. Evidence of the mixed-motive invocation of
executive privilege is clearly apparent in both the “Fast and Furious” investigation
as well as the effort to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census.
On June 19, 2012, Eric Holder submitted a letter to President Obama that
provided several reasons justifying the President’s invocation of executive
privilege over the post-February 4, 2011 documents subpoenaed by Congress.89
88. Id.
89. Cora Currier, The Facts Behind Obama’s Executive Privilege Claim, PROPUBLICA (June 21, 2012),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-facts-behind-obamas-executive-privilege-claim (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (containing copy of AG Holder’s letter dated June 19, 2012 to President
Obama requesting that the President invoke executive privilege for documents subpoenaed by Congress as part
of its investigation into “Fast and Furious”).
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The principal justification was that executive privilege should be claimed to
preserve the confidentiality of deliberative communications—one of the legitimate
bases on which to invoke the privilege.90 However, the letter couches this claim on
the fact that the post-February 4, 2011 documents were not generated during “Fast
and Furious.”91 Rather, the requested documents were created “in the course of the
Department’s deliberative process concerning how to respond to congressional and
related media inquiries into that operation.”92 Of course, that is precisely the reason
Congress wanted the documents. The Committee’s focus had shifted from
determining whether “Fast and Furious” existed—which the Committee later
learned that it did—to the fact of why the Attorney General had initially claimed
that it did not. The Committee was now directing its laser-like focus on what
appeared to be a cover-up.
Regarding the effort to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census, the
sequence of events and concerns is remarkably similar to that of “Fast and Furious”
investigation. The House Committee was initially suspicious of the Trump
Administration’s plan, and its suspicions grew stronger when it learned that
Secretary Ross’s sworn testimony was contradicted by the facts—namely, that the
plan was hatched well before Ross’s claim that the DOJ had “requested” the
addition of the citizenship question. The Committee’s attention was
understandably drawn to the question of determining why Ross had misled the
Congress. The Committee wanted to ascertain the extent of coordination between
the Commerce Department and the DOJ in creating what was clearly a pretextual
rationale to explain the effort to add the citizenship question.93 Also, the
Committee wanted to determine the involvement of “internal and outside parties
in implementing the question.”94 The Committee learned that the Trump
Administration and its transition team had been in contact with Thomas Hofeller,
who was the author of a secret study in 2015 that concluded, “adding a citizenship
question” was “a necessary step to excluding immigrants from legislative
redistricting.”95 The invocation of executive privilege had two objectives: first, to
protect the privacy of deliberative communications between President and both the
Commerce Secretary and the Attorney General—one of the essential purposes of
executive privilege. The second objective was to keep secret the internal
machinations of the executive branch that were born of an ignoble purpose.
In both investigations—“Fast and Furious” and the effort to add a citizenship
question to the 2020 census—executive privilege was asserted on the one hand, to

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Maloney Memorandum, supra note 31, at 2–3.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 10 (citing Thomas Hofeller, The Use of Citizen Voting Age Population in Redistricting, (2015),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6111284/May-31-2019-Unredacted-Exhibits.pdf)) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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keep deliberative communications confidential, while on the other to prevent
embarrassment at best or the detection of wrongdoing at worst.
IV. PREVIOUS ALTERNATIVES TO CURB EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVERREACH IN
THE INVOCATION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
This section will discuss the following three previously proposed alternatives
intended to permit Congress to obtain requested or subpoenaed documents when
the President has invoked executive privilege and, as a result, has refused to
comply with Congress’s request: (1) reinstituting use of its inherent contempt
power to coerce compliance; (2) referring the contempt citation for prosecution of
the contemnor under 2 U.S.C. § 194; and (3) seeking enforcement through the
courts to obtain compliance under 28 U.S.C. § 1365.
A. Congress’s Inherent Contempt Power
While Congress’s inherent contempt power is not specifically granted in the
Constitution, it is considered necessary for Congress to be able to investigate and
legislate effectively.96
The first occasion where Congress exercised its inherent contempt power
occurred in 1795.97 Three members of the House of Representatives reported that
two men attempted to bribe them.98 The House adopted a resolution ordering the
Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest the two men and detain them pending further action by
the House.99
The House convened a hearing which accorded the accused certain due process
rights, including a signed Information stating the charges, the right to call
witnesses, and a limited right of cross-examination which required the accused to
submit their questions in writing to the Speaker who then asked the questions. 100
The House found one of the accused guilty while acquitting the others.101 The
convicted man was detained in custody for at least nine days until he was
discharged by another House resolution with a stern reprimand from the speaker.102
The case is significant because it was the first time Congress used its inherent
contempt authority; ordered the arrest and detention in custody of an accused;
conducted a trial proceeding and, upon conviction, imposed a punishment upon a

96. See Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 11.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id.
102. Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 4. The available information does not indicate on what date
the accused were detained, but they were held in custody at least from the time the proceeding began on January
4, 1796 until January 13, 1796.
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citizen who was not a member of Congress.103 Importantly, virtually no member
of Congress objected to its punishing a non-member for contempt.104 That
observation is noteworthy because many members of Congress had also been
members of the Constitutional Convention and were “aware of the legislative
practices of the time.”105 It was “substantially agreed that the grant of the
legislative power to Congress carried with it by implication the power to punish
for contempt.”106
While the consensus was that Congress possessed the authority to punish
contempt, it was not until 1821 that there was a court decision affirming the
consensus. In Anderson v. Dunn,107 the plaintiff sent a member of the House of
Representatives a letter offering him a payment of $500 for assistance in a land
deal.108 The member, believing that the letter was offering him a bribe, presented
it to the House, which in turn adopted a resolution ordering Dunn—the Sergeantat-Arms—to arrest Anderson and bring him before the House for questioning by
the Speaker.109 Consistent with the due process procedures adopted by the House
in 1795 in addressing the earlier bribery case discussed supra, the House allowed
Anderson to be represented by an attorney and to call witnesses.110 The House
found Anderson in contempt of Congress, ordered him to be reprimanded by the
Speaker, and discharged him into Dunn’s custody.111
Anderson filed suit against Dunn alleging assault, battery, and false
imprisonment.112 Dunn defended against the lawsuit, claiming that he was merely
following the House’s lawful orders.113 In addressing this defense, the USSC was
required to determine whether the House possessed the inherent authority to punish
Anderson.114
In analyzing this issue, the USSC ruled that the Constitution does not expressly
grant to either the Senate or the House the power to punish contempt except those
committed by their members. However, the high court also held that Congress has
an implied power to punish contempt committed by non-members.
The USSC reasoned that if the House did not have the authority to punish
contempt by non-members, then that would result in “the total annihilation of the
power of the House of Representatives to guard itself from contempts,” and would

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting C.S. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA L. REV. 691,
720 (1926)).
107. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).
108. See Rosenberg & Tatelman supra note 1, at 7 n.46.
109. See id. at 7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 7.
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leave “it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even
conspiracy. . ..”115 The court ruled that that consequence is simply “too wild to be
suggested.”116 Therefore, the court concluded that the authority for Congress to
punish contempt must be implied.
The USSC found additional support for its holding that the Congress possessed
the implied power to punish contempt in the structure of the Constitution. In
describing the Constitution, the court stated, “There is not in the whole of that
admirable instrument, a grant of powers that does not draw after it others, not
expressed, but vital to their exercise; not substantive and independent, indeed, but
auxiliary and subordinate.”117
There are two other issues addressed in Anderson v. Dunn that require
discussion: (1) the definition of contumacious acts; and (2) the length of time that
Congress can order a defendant incarcerated after conviction for contempt.
1. Definition of Contumacious Acts
Commentators have noted that the court in Anderson v. Dunn did not define
what actions would constitute contempt.118 In fact—somewhat curiously—the
Anderson court opined that, “there is nothing on the face of this record from which
it can appear on what evidence this warrant was issued.”119 Rather than inquire into
the evidence that prompted the congressional proceeding against Anderson, and
on the basis of which he was convicted, the USSC simply assumed that sufficient
evidence of contempt was placed before Congress. “And are we not to presume
that the House of Representatives would have issued it without duly establishing
the fact charged on the individual.”120 As for any other conduct occurring before
Congress that merited punishment, the high court ruled that Congress has the
“absolute legislative power given to Congress within this District” to prohibit it.121
So while not defining contumacious conduct, the USSC essentially held that if
Congress finds that such conduct occurred, that is sufficient for the court.
Moreover, for other “insults” before Congress, Congress may simply legislate
against them.122

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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2. Length of Incarceration
The Anderson court confronted the issue of determining the limit of
Congress’s power to punish a contumacious offender.123 The USSC reasoned that
the authority to prosecute an offender depends upon the power to punish.124 “If the
House of Representatives possessed no authority to punish for contempt, the
initiating process issued in the assertion of that authority must have been illegal;
there was a want of jurisdiction to justify it.”125 While recognizing that Congress’s
power to legislate is not time-limited, the Court held that “the legislative body
ceases to exist at the moment of its adjournment or periodic dissolution. It follows
that imprisonment must terminate with adjournment.”126
Although from 1795 until 1857 Congress ordered fourteen contempt citations,
no punitive action was taken in seven; while (with the exception of the one
individual who purged his contempt by compliance) only two contemnors were
imprisoned.127 The available records (as compiled by Professor Beck) do not
indicate that during the time from 1795 until 1857 that Congress either approved
or sought any contempt citations against executive branch employees. Congress
has not used its inherent contempt authority since 1935, and its continued use has
been described as “‘unseemly,’ cumbersome, time-consuming, and relatively
ineffective, especially for a modern Congress with a heavy legislative workload
that would be interrupted by a trial at the bar.”128 One of the reasons for its relative
ineffectiveness is that any imprisonment imposed because of contumacious
conduct must terminate at the conclusion of the legislative session.129
Another constraint on Congress’s use of its inherent contempt power—in
addition to the length of time it could order a contemnor’s imprisonment—is
illustrated by Kilbourn v. Thompson.130 In Kilbourn, the House was investigating
the collapse of a real estate pool in which the United States was a creditor and
suffered losses.131 Congress ordered the arrest of Kilbourn—who was the manager
of the real estate pool—after he refused to produce subpoenaed records and
documents.132 He was then arrested, tried under Congress’s inherent authority,
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 230.
Id. at 225.
Anderson, 19 U.S. at 225.
Id. at 231.
CARL BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: A STUDY OF THE PROSECUTIONS INITIATED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1945–1957, at 245–46, Appendix C (2012) (1959).
128. Todd Garvey, Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law,
History,
Practice,
and
Procedure,
CONG. RSCH. SERV.
1,
12
(May
12,
2017),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing S. REP.
NO. 95–170,
at 97 (1977)).
129. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935).
130. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
131. See Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 8.
132. Id.
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convicted, and imprisoned.133 Kilbourn brought suit for false arrest, and the lower
court dismissed his suit; but the USSC reversed, holding that Congress’s power to
punish contemnors under its inherent contempt authority was not unlimited.134 The
USSC found that Congress’s investigation into the real estate pool was not
undertaken in legitimate pursuit of it constitutional responsibilities, “but rather was
an attempt to pry into the personal finances of private individuals, a subject that
could not conceivably result in the enactment of valid legislation.”135 Therefore,
the high court held that the House resolution authorizing “the investigation was in
excess of the power conferred on that body by the Constitution.”136
While imprisonment was a sanction that was imposed more frequently in the
18th and 19th centuries, and which the Court upheld, “the current court . . .may not
afford Congress the same latitude with respect to its inherent contempt power.”137
The USSC expressed its hesitancy to support Congress’s right to imprison
individuals for contempt in United States v. Lovett.138 “Those who wrote our
Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take
away the life, liberty, or property of particular named persons, because the
legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment.”139
B. Criminal Contempt Under 2 U.S.C. § 192140
1. The Enactment of 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194
In 1857, Congress enacted 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194 to increase the maximum
punishment that could be imposed on a contemnor to one year in prison and
(originally) a $1,000 fine.141 The statute was intended to be invoked in addition to,
and not in lieu of, Congress’s inherent contempt power.142 Under its inherent
contempt power, the length of imprisonment was limited to the duration of the
legislative session—a time considered insufficiently short to constitute the drastic
punishment that contumacious witnesses deserved.143 During the debate on the bill,
Representative Orr of South Carolina presented the following hypothetical to the
House of Representatives:

133. Id.
134. Id. at 9.
135. See Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 10.
136. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196 (1881).
137. Charles J. Cooper, Response to Congressional Requests for Information Regarding Decisions Made
Under the Independent Counsel Act, 10 OFF. LEGAL COUNS. 68, 86 (1986).
138. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 18–19.
141. See Ross & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 20 n.119 (citing the maximum fine is now set at a maximum
of $100,000 as well as imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one year).
142. Garvey, supra note 128, at 17.
143. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935).
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Suppose that two days before the adjournment of this Congress there is a gross
attempt on the privileges of this House by corrupt means of any description: then
the power of this House extends only to those two days. Is this an adequate
punishment? Ought we not then to pass a law which will make the authority of the
House respected. . ..144
A clear inference from that excerpt is that the statutes’ purpose is punitive as
opposed to it being construed as coercive—that Congress was more interested in
punishing the contemnor than on obtaining the contemnor’s testimony and
documents.145 That interpretation is strengthened by the fact that an individual
convicted under the statute cannot purge the contempt finding by later complying
with the original subpoena.146
2. The Legislative History of 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194
The legislative history of 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194 after enactment undermines
the original and clearly expressed intention that these statutes would give Congress
a more powerful and punitive weapon than its inherent contempt authority
provided by imposing a mandatory reporting duty for the Congress and a
mandatory prosecuting duty for the USA. However, statutory construction of those
statutes, judicial decisions construing and applying them, certain pertinent
common law authorities, and constitutional principles virtually all support the
interpretation that—notwithstanding the statutory wording—these duties are
discretionary—not mandatory. If the duties are not mandatory, then Congress has
one less tool to enforce its subpoenas for documents and testimony from the
executive branch. If the duties are mandatory, then the threat of a substantial fine
and period of confinement for conviction for contempt of Congress may serve as
strong incentives for executive branch compliance.
a. Statutory Construction
Enforcement of these statutes faces a continuing challenge based on problems
of statutory interpretation. Title 2 U.S.C. § 194 states in part that after the Congress
144. See Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 22 n.131 (citing 42 Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess.,
404 (1857)).
145. See United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676–677 (1970) (citing Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess.
405 (1857)) (“However, in 1857, Congress determined that more severe sanctions were necessary to compel
testimony and the forerunner of the present contempt statute [2 U.S.C. §§192 and 194] “was passed in order ‘***
to inflict a greater punishment than the committee believed the House possessed the power to inflict.’”)). (Brackets
added).
146. See Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1, at 23 n.141 (collecting cases in which courts have rejected
claims that defendants had purged themselves of contempt by later complying with Congressional subpoenas, but
also noting that in at least one case, a court suspended a sentence where later compliance occurred). Importantly,
where the sentence was stayed, the conviction remained nevertheless, further reinforcing the punitive nature of
the statute. See United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 617 (D.D.C. 1961).
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adopted a contempt resolution and the Speaker of the House or the President of the
Senate certify the matters, it must be presented to “the appropriate United States
attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for its
action.”147 It is notable “that § 194 does not on its face actually require the USA to
proceed with the prosecution of a person cited by a house of Congress for
contempt; by its express terms the statute discusses only referral to a grand jury.”148
So, the first inquiry must be to determine whether the USA is required to refer the
matter of Congressional contempt to the grand jury. The DOJ, in Congressional
testimony, opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a handful of case
decisions, and general constitutional principles all support the proposition the
“duties” to refer a Congressional contempt matter to the USA and the attorney’s
duty to refer the matter to the grand jury is discretionary.149
b. OLC Opinions
In his 1984 OLC opinion, then-Assistant Attorney General
Theodore B. Olson cited prior DOJ Congressional testimony affirming the
Department’s long-held position that the decision of the U.S. Attorney to refer a
Congressional contempt matter to the grand jury is discretionary.150
In the past, the Department of Justice has taken the position that if Congress
cited an executive officer for contempt because of an assertion of executive
privilege and “the Department determined to its satisfaction that the claim was
rightfully made, it would not, in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, present
the matter to a grand jury.”151
3. Court Decisions re: Mandatory Reporting Duties

147. See 2 U.S.C. § 194; supra note 19.
148. See Theodore B. Olson, Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who
Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 OFF. LEGAL COUNS. 101, 118 (1984). This section of the Article
incorporates much of former Assistant Attorney General Olson’s opinion on the issue of whether the duty to refer
a contempt citation to the U.S. Attorney is or is not mandatory.
149. But see Ex parte Frankfeld, 32 F. Supp. 915, 916–17 (D.D.C.1940) (granting habeas corpus relief for
and ordered the release from custody of three petitioners charged with violating 2 U.S.C. §192 for refusing to
answer questions posed by HUAC where the warrant under which they were arrested was supported by an
affidavit signed by a secretary to HUAC, the court holding that because 2 U.S.C. § 194 prescribed mandatory
reporting and prosecuting duties by the Congress and the district attorney [now United States Attorney],
respectively, and those mandatory duties were not fulfilled, petitioners were unlawfully detained).
150. See Olson, supra note 148, at 119–20.
151. Id. at 119 (citing the Testimony of then-Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee, Hearings on
Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court, Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976)).
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a. Port Authority Cases
In 1960, as part of an investigation into the Port of New York Authority, the
House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed documents from three officials of the Port
Authority.152 When they failed to produce the documents, the House followed the
House Judiciary Committee’s recommendation and adopted contempt resolutions
against them and referred the resolutions to the USA.153 When the USA failed to
present any of the three Congressional contempt matters to the grand jury, the DOJ
decided to proceed by way of information rather than indictment, thereby
bypassing the grand jury.154
Ultimately, the DOJ determined to prosecute only one of the three Port
Authority officials—the Executive Director of the Port Authority, Austin Tobin—
and announced that they would not prosecute the remaining two.155
Although there was a change in Presidential administrations (from Eisenhower
to Kennedy) during this time, the incoming Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy—
who took over supervision of Tobin’s trial—did not reverse the earlier decision
not to prosecute the other two Port Authority officials.156 So, under two different
Presidential administrations, what appeared to be a clear statutory mandate for the
USA to prosecute the three Congressional contempt citations was disregarded.
b. Anti-war Activist Cases
The following are two cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia that assist in defining the extent to which the USA has the
discretion whether to refer a contempt of Congress citation to the grand jury.157
In one of these cases, the court refused to consider challenges to Congressional
subpoenas because the prospective witnesses had a number of alternatives to
challenge a committee’s contempt finding without a court challenge. In the other
case, such alternatives did not exist; therefore, the court did consider and grant
relief to a putative contemnor who had requested that the court quash a grand jury
subpoena.
In Ansara v. Eastland, the court declined to consider anti-Vietnam war
activists’ motion to quash a Congressional subpoena for five reasons.158 First, the
court determined that granting the requested relief would be premature because it
would constitute an interference with an ongoing Congressional proceeding,

152. See Olson, supra note 148, at 119.
153. Id. The Port Authority is located with the states of New Jersey and New York, and the respective
governors of each had ordered the Port Authority officials not to produce the documents.
154. Id. at 119–20.
155. Id. at 120.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 120–21.
158. Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751, 753–754 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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thereby violating the separation of powers.159 Second, the court found that there
were additional protections that were available that would obviate the need for
court action one of which was that the witness could present his constitutional
objections to the subcommittee that issued the subpoenas.160 Third, the pertinent
House could resolve not to adopt the contempt resolution recommended by the
subcommittee.161 Fourth, the executive branch could decide not to present the
matter before the grand jury.162 Fifth, the grand jury could decline to return a true
bill.163 Thus, in Ansara, the subpoenaed witnesses had a number of alternatives
they could pursue that would avoid the need for the court’s intervention in a motion
to quash the subpoenas.
The situation in Ansara was starkly different from that in United States
Servicemen’s Fund v. Eastland.164 United States Servicemen’s Fund (USSF) was
a non-profit tax-exempt membership organization the principal purpose of which
was to use coffee houses that were located “near and on about 17 large federal
military installations” and the newspapers it supported to “convert military
personnel into opposing the United States military operations in Vietnam.”165 The
USSF sometimes engaged in violence to further its objectives, which prompted a
Senate investigation.166 But rather than subpoenaing USSF leadership to determine
the nature and extent of USSF’s financial support (including membership
information), the Senate’s Judiciary Committee and its Sub-Committee on Internal
Security issued a subpoena to Chemical Bank in New York City at which USSF
conducted banking business.167 The Sub-Committee subpoenaed a broad swathe of
USSF’s financial records which would necessarily result in the disclosure of the
names of USSF members and contributors.168 Since membership contributions
supported USSF, it feared that Chemical Bank’s compliance with the subpoena
would severely affect its fundraising and ability to continue what it asserts were its
constitutionally protected activities.169
USSF sought injunctive relief both to restrain Chemical Bank from complying
with the subpoena and—importantly—to prevent the Sub-Committee and staff
counsel from seeking enforcement of its subpoena by the use of its contempt
power.170 USSF alleged in its complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and
159. Id. at 753 (“First, the plaintiffs seek relief that would precede and seek to relate to the conduct of a
future legislative hearing. The courts avoid use of extraordinary remedies that involve ‘needless friction with a
coordinate branch of the government.”).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 754 (citing Wilson v. United States, 369 F. 2d 198, 201 (D.D. Cir. 1966).
162. Id. at 754 n.6.
163. Id.
164. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
165. Id. at 1271–72 (Mackinnon, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1254.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1255.
170. Eastland, 488 F.2d at 1255–56.

154

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 53
injunctive relief that the issuance of the subpoena to Chemical Bank (instead of to
USSF itself) was intended to “deprive plaintiffs of their rights to protect their
private records, such as the sources of their contributions, as they would be entitled
to if the subpoena had been issued against them directly.”171 USSF sought a
declaratory judgment holding that the subpoena was illegal.172
The court acknowledged the government’s concession that the purpose of the
subpoena was to obtain the names of the contributors to USSF.173 In reversing the
district court’s denial of declaratory relief to USSF and remanding the matter, the
D.C. Circuit distinguished the case from Ansara. Unlike the five alternatives to
avoid the court’s intervention available to the plaintiffs in Ansara, the plaintiffs in
United Servicemen’s Fund had none. The court stated:
Here the plaintiffs have no alternative means tovindicate their rights.
They cannot contest a subpoena issued on the Chemical Bank before the
Committee or before the Senate, and they cannot force the bank’s uninvolved
officials to run the risk of contempt citations and criminal trials to aid the plaintiffs
in establishing their First Amendment rights.174
The government argued that plaintiffs lacked standing because “the subpoena
was not directed to appellants, but to a third-party commercial bank.175 In what the
court characterized as a “makeweight argument at best,” the court made short shrift
of this argument in finding that if the forced disclosure of USSF contributors
violated its First Amendment rights, then USSF is also an aggrieved party just as
Chemical Bank is since the subpoena was served on it.176
c. House Speaker’s Duty
In Wilson v. United States, the defendant was a witness who—along with two
others who a HUAC subcommittee had subpoenaed—refused to answer questions
in executive session unless also given the opportunity to do so in a public setting.177

171. Id. at 1255.
172. Id. at 1256.
173. Id. at 1267.
174. Id. at 1260.
175. Id. at 1261. This Article discusses both United Servicemen’s Fund and Ansara for the limited purpose
of identifying the conditions under which the courts will entertain motions to quash grand jury subpoenas when
a party is found in contempt for non-compliance or is at risk of being found in contempt and those under which
the courts will not. That distinction is relevant to resolving the issue of whether or not the USA has any discretion
to refer a Congressional contempt citation to the grand jury and to prosecute the matter after the grand jury returns
a true bill. Ansara lists the two discretionary actions that the USA could take—in addition to actions that the
prospective witness could take prior to that—that would avoid the court’s involvement. These alternatives support
the argument that not only does the USA have discretion whether to refer a Congressional contempt citation to
the grand jury but also that the House and the Senate retain similar discretion.
176. Eastland, 488 F.2d at 1261.
177. Wilson v. United States, 369 F. 2d 198, 199, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Their refusal occurred when the Congress was not in session.178 According to the
reporting provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 194, the full committee “transmitted to the
Speaker a statement of facts with respect to each of the alleged contempts.”179 The
Speaker informed the House upon its return that he had certified the statements to
the USA, as mandated by the statute.180
On appeal the court addressed the issue of whether transmission of the
committee’s statement of facts by the Speaker to the USA was required to be
automatic.181 In holding that the certification was not required to be automatic, the
court relied upon Congressional practice since 1857 and case authority. With
respect to prior Congressional practice, the court found that:
It has been the consistent legislative course that the Speaker is not under
“mandatory” duty to certify the report of the committee, but on the
contrary that the committee’s report is subject to further consideration on
the merits by the House involved.182
The Wilson court opined that given the reporting provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 194,
it was apparent that “the construction of the statute does not contemplate an empty
ceremony.”183 The Wilson court relied in part on In re Chapman as an additional
basis for its recognition that the reporting provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 194 are
discretionary.184 In its chronology of the salient events, the Chapman court noted
that the House had already passed a tariff bill that was currently under
consideration in the Senate. As part of its debate on the bill, the Senate was
considering whether to adopt certain amendments to the bill that would provide for
duties on sugar that were different from those contained in the House bill.185 The
Senate—having become aware of allegations of corruption on the part of some of
its members who may have had interests in sugar stocks—established a committee
to investigate the allegations.186 As part of the investigation, the committee
summoned the petitioner who was a stockbroker.187 The committee asked
Chapman if his firm had bought or sold sugar stocks during the time in question

178. Id. at 200.
179. Id.
180. Id. The defendants were convicted of violating 2 U.S.C. § 192.
181. Id. at 201.
182. Id. (citing BECK, supra note 127, at 191–240 [case citation refers to pp. 195–240] which the court
characterized as describing contempt citations since 1857 and which demonstrates “beyond any doubt that the
House and the Senate have consistently considered, and occasionally debated at length, resolutions authorizing
the Speaker of the House of the President pro tempore of the Senate to certify under the statute. Vote have often
been cast against such resolutions.”).
183. Wilson, 369 F. 2d 204.
184. Id. at 202 (citing In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 667 (1897)).
185. Chapman, 166 U.S. at 663.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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on behalf of any United States Senators.188 Chapman refused to answer the
committee’s questions, was found in contempt, convicted by jury trial, and
imprisoned.189
In addressing the procedures for committee reporting of a witness’
contumacious conduct and of the corresponding duty of either the House Speaker
or the President pro tempore of the Senate to certify reports of that conduct to the
USA, the court observed:
When the facts are reported to the particular House, the question or
questions may undoubtedly be withdrawn or modified, or the presiding
officer directed not to certify. . ..190
However, as Olson argues, the fact that the Wilson court found that the
Speaker’s duty to report a Congressional contempt resolution to the U.S. Attorney
is discretionary does not conclusively demonstrate that the U.S. Attorney’s duty is
also discretionary.191 But it does support provide some support for that
conclusion.192
4. Court Decisions: General Discretionary Powers of the DOJ
In addition to case authority for the proposition that the USA has the discretion
not to refer a contempt citation to the grand jury—notwithstanding the seemingly
mandatory language of 2 U.S.C. § 194—there is substantial authority for the
position that there is broad executive branch discretionary authority to determine
whether it will prosecute any case.193 “The general rule is that ‘the Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case.’”194 This broad discretionary authority applies, for example, even
when a statute—such as 28 U.S.C. § 547—contains such mandatory language as,
“each United States Attorney, within his district, shall . . . prosecute for all offenses
against the United States.”195

188. Id. at 663–64.
189. Id. at 662.
190. Id. at 667 (suggesting that the clear, respective duties of the House Speaker and the Senate President
pro tempore are discretionary).
191. See Olson, supra note 148, at 121.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 123.
194. Id. at 126 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)).
195. Id. at 123 (citing Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906
(1966) (denying a mandamus petition seeking to force the Attorney General to prosecute a national bank. “It is
well-settled that the question of whether and when prosecution is to be instituted is within the discretion of the
Attorney General. Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of this discretion.”)).
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a. Constitutional Principles: Separation of Powers
While the USA has an apparent duty—based on the statutory language—to
present a contempt citation to the grand jury, case law, statutory construction,
general principles of constitutional law, and O.L.C. opinions undermine that
inference. The reason is clear: the USA may decide not to present the matter to the
grand jury; may decline to sign the indictment if one is returned; may refuse to
prosecute the case; or may choose to dismiss it.
In commenting on the separation of powers, Olson wrote,“[i]f the
congressional contempt statute were interpreted to divest the United States
Attorney of discretion, then the statute would create two distinct problems with
respect to the separation of powers.”196 It would strip the executive branch of its
responsibility under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, which directs the
President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” and it would permit
Congress to determine whether or not a particular individual should be
prosecuted.197
It is relevant to consider the political dimension of the USA’s decision whether
to prosecute a contemnor. All USAs are appointed by the President.198 When a new
President is elected, that President can—and usually does—appoint a new slate of
USAs. Since all executive branch employees work for the President, it is extremely
unlikely that a USA will prosecute, for example, a Cabinet official who—in all
likelihood—is of the same political party as the President. This exact situation
occurred in the contempt resolutions against Holder, Barr, and Ross. Thus, the
reservation of these discretionary powers to the legislative and executive branches
of the government is a double-edged sword.
First, statutory contempt presents Congress with another way—in addition to
its inherent contempt authority—to encourage compliance with its subpoenas.
Second, if a contumacious witness continues to refuse compliance either because
of the witness’s desire to litigate the subpoena in good faith or out of abject
defiance, statutory contempt does not offer a guarantee that the witness’s
cooperation will be achieved. If the contumacious witness is not persuaded by the
possibility of prosecution for statutory contempt and is—in the very unlikely
event—subsequently prosecuted and convicted, the witness’s noncompliance is
likely to continue.199 The witness has no incentive to cooperate as the witness
196. See Olson, supra note 148, at 127.
197. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (specifying the duties of the President, including that “he shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.).
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 541.
199. The most frequent use of statutory contempt occurred between 1943–1957 by HUAC created by a
House Resolution which was incorporated into 60 Stat. 828–829 (1946) and its immediate predecessor the Dies
Committee established in 1938. See BECK, supra note 127, at 13 n.34–35. The major concern of this committee,
which conducted 230 public hearings at which more 3,000 people testified, “was with ferreting out communist
and subversives in many aspects of societal life in the United States.” Id. at 14. During that time period, the HUAC
referred 132 cases for prosecution under § 194 of which 37 were convicted. Id. at Appendix C, 2 at 247–48. There
is no indication that any of these individuals were cabinet or other high-ranking officials of the executive branch.

158

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 53
cannot purge the contempt even if cooperation is later forthcoming. While the
possibility that a sentence of confinement could be suspended upon later
compliance with a subpoena, the conviction will not be purged. So, the virtue of
statutory contempt may well be better conceived as a threat to coerce compliance
rather than as a punitive measure to be imposed upon conviction. Given the
political realities influencing the prosecutorial decision, statutory contempt proves
not to be a highly effective tool if the goal is to obtain compliance with
Congressional subpoenas by the executive branch.200
b. Civil Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas
The use of both the inherent contempt power and the statutory contempt
authority reflects the ongoing dilemma that Congress faces in reacting to
contumacious witnesses. First, Congress wants to obtain information and
testimony from witnesses who may not wish to provide either. Second, Congress
cannot simply ignore contumacious conduct without thereby encouraging it. One
underdeveloped and underimplemented remedy is the civil enforcement of
Congressional subpoenas, particularly in situations in which the President has
invoked executive privilege and subsequently failed to comply with those
subpoenas.
C. Summary of Previous Efforts of Civil Enforcement of Congressional
Subpoenas
The first effort at enacting a jurisdiction statute for civil enforcement of
Congressional subpoenas occurred in 1953.201 The bill provided that “either House,
upon a majority vote of its members, to ‘invoke the aid of the United States district
court in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of

200. An additional constraint on the application of statutory contempt is the requirement that the contemnor
must have refused to answer a question or failed to produce a document that is pertinent to the investigation. See
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214–216 (1957). HUAC subpoenaed Watkins to testify, and he denied
allegations made by another witness that Watkins was a Communist although he admitted that from 1942 to 1947
he made contributions to Communist causes and participated in Communist activities. Id. at 183–84. However,
when he was asked by HUAC whether or not he knew if individuals that a previous witness had identified as
members of the Communist Party were in fact Communist Party members, he refused to answer those questions
(but did not invoke the Fifth Amendment), claiming that those questions were not relevant to HUAC’s work, and
a contempt citation was certified to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution based on his refusal to answer those specific
questions. Id. at 185–186. Watkins was convicted on nine counts of violating 2 U.S.C. §192; his sentence of a
fine of $100 and imprisonment for one year was suspended, and he was placed on probation. Id. at 186. The USSC
reversed Watkins’ conviction on the grounds that HUAC’s authorizing resolution was too broad and indefinite
and the Chairman of the committee’s description of the inquiry was no clearer. Id. at 214, 216. As a result, Watkins
was not provided “a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer” because
the Committee never explained the pertinency of the questions which he refused to answer. Id. at 215.
201. James Hamilton & John C. Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege
Disputes Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. LEGIS. 145, 160 (1984).
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evidence.’”202 While the House passed the bill, the Senate took no action.203 The
bill was reintroduced in three more Congressional sessions, but Congress did not
take action.204
There were at least seven subsequent legislative proposals to remedy
Congress’ inability to secure compliance with its subpoena requests by the
executive branch when the President invoked executive privilege.205 All of these
were proposed because of the Watergate investigation, and—except for two—
Congress did not enact any into law.206
1. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon
The first of the two legislative proposals that were enacted into law was drafted
in direct response to the district court’s ruling in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.207 The Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities (the Committee) had served two subpoenas on
the President for documents and tape recordings pertinent to its investigation into
the Watergate scandal.208 The Committee decided to serve the subpoenas after it
learned that President Nixon had a secret voice-activated tape recording system in
the White House and after informal efforts to obtain the tape recordings and related
documents had failed.209 In a letter to the Committee Chairman, the President
declined to comply with the subpoenas.210 The Committee then commenced its
civil action seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief compelling
compliance with the subpoenas.211
While noting that the suit raised a number of important issues, District Judge
John Sirica ruled that before any of the other issues could be addressed, the
Committee must demonstrate that the court had jurisdiction to decide the matter.212
Although the Committee asserted four jurisdictional arguments, it relied
principally on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which included (at the time) as a jurisdictional
prerequisite that the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $10,000

202. Id. (citing H.R. 4975, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), which did not exclude executive branch officials
from its scope)).
203. See generally Hamilton & Grabow, supra note 201.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 160–62.
206. Id.
207. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.C.C. 1973).
208. Id. at 54.
209. Id. at 53–54. A witness had testified that conversations were recorded during the time of the 1972
Presidential campaign and election as well as the Watergate burglary. The Committee believed that the
subpoenaed tapes and documents would have a direct bearing on its investigation.
210. Id. at 54.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 55.
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exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.”213
Ruling that the minimum amount in controversy was not a mere technicality
Congress could dispense with at will, the district court held that, “. . . [it] cannot
find any basis on which to assign a dollar value to the amount in controversy.” 214
Accordingly, on October 17, 1973, the court dismissed the action without reaching
the problem of justiciability or the merits of the case.215 In reaching its conclusion,
the court provided a strong hint to Congress to overcome the “amount in
controversy” requirement—abandon it.216
Congress did exactly that when, on December 18, 1973, Public Law 93-190
was enacted into law without the President’s signature.217 Congress tailored and
limited the statute’s provisions exclusively to the Committee’s investigation.
Among its more prominent features, the statute: (1) designated the District Court
for the District of Columbia with original jurisdiction over civil actions brought by
the Committee “to enforce or secure a declaration concerning the validity of any
subpoena or order” for “information, documents, taped recordings, or other
material” related to the Committee’s investigation issued by the Committee to a
list of executive branch personnel including the President and Vice-President; (2)
eliminated the jurisdictional “amount in controversy” for actions brought by the
Committee; and (3) granted jurisdiction to the District Court for the District of
Columbia “to enter any such judgment or decree in any such civil action” to
enforce any subpoena or order pertaining to the Committee’s investigation.218
2. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978
In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, President Jimmy Carter signed the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 into law on October 26, 1978.219
The Act includes a provision for the establishment of the Office of Senate
Legal Counsel comprised of the Senate Legal Counsel and a Deputy Senate Legal

213. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 366 F. Supp. at 55–59.
214. Id. at 61.
215. Id.
216. Id.
The Court has been requested to invoke a jurisdiction which only Congress can grant but which Congress has
heretofore withheld. Whether such jurisdiction ought to be conferred is the prerogative of the Congress. Plaintiffs,
of course, are free to pursue whatever remedy they now deem appropriate, but the Court cannot, consistent with
law and the constitutional principles that reserve to Congress the conferral of jurisdiction, validate the present
course.
217. Pub. L. No. 93–190, 87 Stat. 736.
218. The Committee appealed the judgment of the district court, but in light of the passage of PL 93–190,
the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for further consideration. See Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Activities, 498 F.2d at 727–28. Ultimately, the court of appeals dismissed the Committee’s suit
because of the then-pending House Impeachment inquiry. See S. REP. NO. 95–170, at 21 (1977).
219. See 2 U.S.C. § 701.
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Counsel.220 The Office of Senate Legal Counsel has responsibility to bring a civil
action “to enforce, to secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of, or
to prevent a threatened failure or refusal to comply with, any subpena [sic] or order
issued by the Senate or a committee or a subcommittee of the Senate authorized to
issue a subpena (sic) or order.”221 To effectuate this provision, the Act also confers
on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia original jurisdiction
to adjudicate such a civil action, eliminates the previous jurisdictional “amount in
controversy” requirement, provides for contempt for refusal or failure to obey the
court’s order, and mandates that the court expedite any hearings on such matters.222
It also requires that any appeal or petition for review be similarly expedited.223
The contempt proceeding contemplated by the statute requires an order to
show cause hearing and shall be a summary proceeding tried by the court.224 The
express purpose of any sanctions imposed is to compel obedience to court’s order
and is not intended as a solely punitive measure.225
The Act is noteworthy not only for what it provides but also for what it
excludes. First, the statute applies only to the Senate—not the House.226 Second, it
excludes from its ambit any federal government officials.227
For more than seventy years, Congress has attempted to move beyond the use
of its inherent contempt authority and statutory contempt power to address
effectively executive branch refusals to comply with Congressional subpoenas
particularly when the executive branch invokes privilege. It is unfortunate that the
culmination of these efforts has resulted in the enactment of a civil enforcement
statute that is inapplicable to federal government officials and which excludes the
House as a party that could bring an enforcement action.
It is time to consider whether Congress should enact a different legislative
proposal that would incorporate certain key features of § 1365 and would

220. See 2 U.S.C. § 288.
221. Id. at § 288d. This section also sets out several required procedural steps that must be taken by the
Senate before Counsel may initiate a civil action. See also S. REP. NO. 95–170.
222. Id. at § 1365.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1365(b).
225. Id.
226. Id. at § 1365(a). There are, however, some scholars who have opined that while the House of
Representatives is excluded under current law from bringing civil actions on its own to enforce its subpoenas for
lack of federal jurisdiction, it may be able to do so if the entire House of Representatives approves a resolution
authorizing suit to enforce its subpoenas. See Rosenberg and Tatelman, supra note 1, at 38. But they note that this
approach may be constitutionally barred because, unless the resolution authorizing subpoena enforcement
proceedings in court has been passed into law and signed by the President, the action would not constitute a
federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. That section confers federal jurisdiction only if the case is one
“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In this situation a
“mere one-House resolution would not suffice to provide such jurisdiction.” See Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra
note 1, at 38.
227. Id. (“This section shall not apply to an action to enforce, secure a declaratory judgment concerning
the validity of, or to prevent a threatened refusal to comply with, any subpoena [sic] or order issued to an officer
or employee of the Federal Government acting within his official capacity.”).
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circumvent the obstacles that Congress encounters in bringing contemnors to
heel.228 Such a proposal would authorize suit on an expedited basis for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief. The court would deal with non-complying
contemnors by summary proceedings with a range of sanctions including fines and
imprisonment.
The major difference between § 1365 and the alternative proposed here lies in
who it is that may bring the suit. Since Congressional efforts have failed—and
likely will continue to fail229—the alternative proposal would vest the authority to
bring suit in eligible private, non-profit, and tax-exempt organizations which have
§ 501(c)(3) status. Those organizations must have stated purposes that include
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief when Congress has held the
executive branch in contempt for refusing to provide subpoenaed information and
the President has asserted executive privilege. The major obstacle that such an
organization would face is the requirement to demonstrate standing, which Part IV
discusses.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
A. Draft Statute
In this part, this Article presents a draft statute that is intended to remedy the
deficiencies identified and discussed supra.230 Following the presentation of the
statute, this Article will address both the ways in which the draft statute overcomes
those obstacles and satisfies the standing requirement.
Title 28 of the United States Code is amended by adding the following new
section:
228. The author is indebted to James Hamilton and John C. Grabow for their pioneering work in this area
by having proposed a legislative solution to the issues addressed in this Article. The Article draws liberally on
many of their suggestions, but parts company with them on the question of who or what agency is best equipped
to file the civil action necessary to enforce Congressional subpoenas. They would vest the authority in the
Congress, while this Article advocates that qualifying § 501(c)(3) organizations would be more effective. See
generally Hamilton & Grabow, supra at note 201.
229. In discussing Olson’s O.L.C. 1984 opinion, this Article focused on Olson’s view that the reporting
and referring duties under § 194 are discretionary. See supra Part IV. Additionally, Olson also reasserts a DOJ
position, first articulated in 1956 by then-Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers and reiterated continuously
with no DOJ position to the contrary, that “the criminal contempt of Congress statute does not apply to executive
officials who assert claims of executive privilege at the direction of the President.” See Olson, supra note 148, at
129. See also Letter from Jeffrey A. Rosen, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, House Speaker (July 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/G3YA-NFR9 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (summarizing the use made
by both political parties of the policy that “The Department of Justice’s long-standing position is that we will not
prosecute an official for contempt of Congress for declining to provide information subject to a presidential
assertion of executive privilege.”). Id. Rosen cites the application of this policy by former President Bush in 2007
(White House officials Harriet Miers and Josh Bolten re: firing of U.S. Attorneys in 2006)) and former President
Obama in 2012 (former AG Holder re: “Fast and Furious”). The reliance on this policy by both political parties
makes it very unlikely that any executive branch official who is held in contempt of Congress for refusing to
provide subpoenaed information would ever face prosecution.
230. See supra Part IV.
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§1365a – Civil Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas to Officers and
Employees of the Federal Government
(a) The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall
have original jurisdiction over, and shall hear, any civil action brought by a
private non-profit organization authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) and
fulfilling all of the requirements of § 1365a(g), to enforce or secure a
declaratory judgment and obtain injunctive relief concerning the validity of
any subpoena or order issued by either House of Congress or any authorized
committee or subcommittee of such House or any joint committee of the
Congress, to any officer or employee of the Federal Government, acting
within his or her official capacity, to secure the production of documents or
other materials of any kind or the answering of any deposition or
interrogatory or to secure testimony of any combination thereof provided that
such enforcement action shall not commence until and unless the House of
Congress issuing the subpoena or order has approved a contempt resolution
and the contempt resolution has been adopted in response to the invocation
of executive privilege by the President of the United States and the executive
branch’s refusal to comply with the subpoena or order as defined in this
section.
(b) Any refusal or failure to obey a lawful order of the District Court
issued pursuant to this Section may be construed by the court as a contempt
thereof. A contempt proceeding shall be commenced by an order to show
cause before the court why the entity or person refusing or failing to obey the
court order should not be held in contempt of court. Such contempt
proceeding shall be tried by the court and shall be summary in manner. The
purpose of sanctions imposed as a result of such contempt proceeding shall be
to compel obedience to the order of the court.
(c) The District Court shall assign any civil action brought pursuant to
this section for hearing at the earliest practicable date and cause the action in
every way to be expedited. Any appeal or petition for review from any order
or judgment in such action shall be expedited in the same manner.
(d) The civil actions authorized by this section are in addition to any other
remedies available to enforce a subpoena or order of a House of Congress,
committee, or subcommittee, including but not limited to the certification of
a criminal contempt proceeding under Section 194 of Title 2.
(e) For the purposes of this section, the term “committee” includes
standing, select, or special committees of either House of Congress, or any
joint committee of Congress, established by law or resolution, and the term
“subcommittee” includes any subcommittee of such committees.
(f) For the purposes of this section, the term “officer or employee of the
Federal Government” includes all officers or employees of the Federal
Government, including the President and Vice President.
(g) For purposes of this section, the term “private non-profit organization
authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) and fulfilling all of the requirements
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of 28 U.S.C. § 1365a(g)” includes the following:
(1) The organization must have the following primary stated purposes, in
addition to other purposes consistent with the organization’s tax-exempt
status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3):
a. To promote integrity, transparency, and accountability in government
and fidelity to the rule of law through public advocacy, litigation, and
monitoring of federal government entities, particularly the Congress and the
executive branch of government with a special emphasis on the following:
Seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as described and
provided for under 28 U.S.C. § 1365a to achieve executive branch compliance
with Congressional subpoenas when the President has invoked executive
privilege and Congress has adopted a contempt resolution in response to the
executive branch’s refusal to comply with the subpoena(s) or order(s) as
defined in § 1365a(a); thereby assisting in restoring constitutional limits on
the power of government; and
b. To conduct an ongoing study of the interrelationship of the Congress
and the executive branch, particularly in situations in which a contempt
resolution has been adopted by either House of Congress in response to the
invocation of executive privilege by the President and the executive branch
has refused to comply with the subpoena or order as defined in § 1365a(a).
(1) The organization shall maintain a historical archive of its study
efforts and shall update the archive annually;
(2) The archive shall consist of the transcripts of all hearings conducted
by the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1365a as well as all pleadings filed in
any matters litigated under this section as well as copies of any declaratory
judgments and injunctive relief ordered by the District Court;
(3) The organization shall maintain the archive in electronic form for
online access by the public in general and the organization’s members in
particular.
B. Overcoming the Obstacles
This Article has identified the three principal ways in which Congress has
attempted to overcome executive branch refusal to comply with Congressional
subpoenas after the President has invoked executive privilege.231 But each of these
alternatives suffers from deficiencies that render these efforts largely ineffective:
(1) the exercise of inherent contempt authority results in periods of confinement
that are too short to compel compliance and have fallen into disuse; (2) the use of
statutory contempt under 2 U.S.C. § 194 lengthens the maximum period of
confinement for contemnors, but is an inadequate incentive for contemnor
compliance and is subject to the discretion of Congress and the United States

231. See supra Part IV.
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Attorney; and (3) the structure of Congress’ civil enforcement mechanism under
28 U.S.C. § 1365 excludes all executive branch officers and employees from its
application, thus undermining the primary purpose for its original enactment.232
The draft statute addresses the deficiencies of the prior alternative approaches
to enforcing Congressional subpoenas when the President has invoked executive
privilege and has subsequently refused to comply with the subpoenas, and
Congress has approved a contempt resolution. As the purpose of the proposed
statute is to secure compliance with its subpoenas, Congress is not as concerned
with punitive measures as it is when Congress uses its inherent contempt authority.
To the extent punitive measures were to be imposed under the draft statute, they
would only be used in response to the putative contemnor’s failing to adhere to the
court’s order—an act of contempt permitting the court to impose either monetary
or punitive sanctions, or both. So, unlike Congress’s inherent contempt power—
which provides for the Congress to impose incarceration as a sanction for the
contemnor’s conduct before Congress—imprisonment under the proposed statute
could only be ordered by the court. In addition, the court’s action would be less
likely to be influenced by political considerations or motivations.233
An additional drawback to the use of statutory contempt as a remedy for
executive branch obstruction to Congress’s investigatory power is that prosecution
under the statute is dependent upon the discretion of Congress. The proposed
statute does not depend upon Congress for the referral of a contempt citation to the
USA. Moreover, the use of the draft statute is not subject to the discretionary action
of the USA who—because of their Presidential appointment—has traditionally
been loath to prosecute individuals of the same political party. Instead, the draft
statute vests authority to seek enforcement of Congressional subpoenas in
designated 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations subject only to the requirement that
Congress must have first adopted a contempt resolution as a condition precedent
to the enforcement action.
The proposed statute relies upon § 501(c)(3) organizations for five reasons.
First, while such organizations are certainly not devoid of political leanings, every
action they take must be reported to the IRS every year on a Form 990 that permits
agency oversight of the organization’s activities. Should any agency engage in
political activity beyond what the law permits, the organization can lose its taxexempt status.
Second, there are many § 501(c)(3) organizations that could fulfill the
requirements under § 1365a(g)(1) of the draft statute, requiring only slight

232. See supra Part IV.
233. Consider in this regard current Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi who, in reference to perceived
contumacious acts committed by members of the Trump administration, perhaps only jokingly teased, “We do
have a little jail down in the basement of the Capitol, but if we were arresting all of the people involved in the
administration, we would have an overcrowded jail situation.” Elia Nilsen, The House Just Voted to Hold AG
William Barr in Contempt of Congress, Vox.com (updated June 11, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/6/11/
18647093/contempt-of-congress-barr-house-vote (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
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modifications to their statements of purpose.234
Third, while it is no doubt the case that liberal-leaning organizations may be
more inclined to seek enforcement under the proposed statute when conservative
administrations are in power, it is equally the case that conservative-leaning
organizations may be similarly inclined to seek enforcement when liberal
administrations are in office. There is a certain equilibrium to the draft statute that
makes its political appeal greater to the body that would need to enact the
legislation—the Congress.
Fourth, the proposed statute contemplates an expedited review by the district
234. See Form 990, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521885088/
202011769349301216/full (last visited May 17, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
Organizations such as Judicial Watch, the Institute for Justice, Common Cause Education Fund, and the United
States Public Interest Research Group Education Fund are all § 501(c)(3) organizations, and they cite purposes
consistent with the objectives of the proposed statute. See 26 U.S.C. § 6033(b) which requires all § 501(c)(3)
organizations to file “Returns by exempt organizations” annually which contain summary statements of the
organization’s purpose as part of a detailed financial accounting of the organization’s activities. That statement is
denominated as a Form 990. See 2020 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax – Under section 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (except private foundations).
Judicial Watch: “To promote integrity, transparency and accountability in government and fidelity to the rule of
law through public advocacy litigation, and monitoring and investigating federal, state and local government
entities and officials, among other activities.” See 2019 Form 990, PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/
nonprofits/organizations/521885088/202011769349301216/full (last visited May 17, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
Institute for Justice: “To protect the constitutional rights of Americans through litigation, to educate the public
about issues vital to liberty through media, activism, and outreach, to apply social science and policy research
methods to those issues that the organization litigates, and to train lawyers and law students.” See 2017 Form 990,
PROPUBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521744337 (last visited May 17, 2021) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
Common Cause Education Fund: “The Common Cause Education Fund works with Common Cause, a
nonpartisan, grassroots organization dedicated to upholding the core values of American democracy, with the
goals of ensuring open, honest, and accountable government; promoting equal rights, opportunity and
representation for all; and empowering all people to make their voices heard as equals in the political process,
CCEF works across four major issue areas: voting and elections, money and politics, ethics, transparency and
government accountability, and media and democracy. . . . The Common Cause Education Fund employs
research, outreach, educational programming, and coalition building to increase public understanding of how our
democracy works, empower citizens to hold their government accountable, and promote broad and effective
citizen engagement at federal, state and local levels.” See 2019 Form 990, PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/311705370/201942969349301904/full (last visited May
17, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
United States Public Interest Research Group Education Fund: “The corporation is organized exclusively for
charitable, educational, and scientific purposes as allowed by Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
including, for such purposes, identifying, researching, analyzing, and pursuing solutions to problems of consumer
protection, environmental preservation, corporate and governmental responsibility to the public, discrimination,
and other issues affecting the social welfare of the people of the United States and to cooperate with other citizen
action groups that qualify as exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code concerning problems
of common concern to people throughout the United States.” See Form 990, PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521384240 (last visited May 17, 2021) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).

167

2021 / Congress’ Contempt Power Over Executive Branch Recalcitrance
court—a provision that 28 U.S.C. § 1365 lacks—and the organizations would not
require anything more of Congress than that it approve a contempt resolution.
There would be no need for any trials or trial-like proceedings in either House of
Congress. There would not be any requirement that the Congress refer the
contempt citation to the USA. Last, there would not be any requirement that the
USA seek enforcement under 2 U.S.C. § 194 because the objective of the proposed
statute is not the imposition of punitive sanctions but the securing of compliance
with the subpoena.
Fifth, the proposed statute would likely have the effect of encouraging
negotiation and settlement of the dispute leading to the contempt resolution. The
parties would know that the court would be required to expedite the litigation, and
the executive branch could not “run out the clock” as it did with Holder as well as
with Barr and Ross.
The current civil enforcement mechanism that exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1365
is not designed to remedy the principal question raised in this Article—what is the
remedy when the executive branch refuses to comply with a Congressional
subpoena and claims executive privilege, and the Congress adopts a contempt
resolution? The current statute is impotent under these circumstances. The
proposed statute overcomes this obstacle because it applies to all employees and
officers of the federal government and specifically includes the President and the
Vice-President.
However, for the proposed statute to be viable, the organization seeking
enforcement must have standing—which is addressed infra.
C. Standing
Under Article III, Section 1, the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal
courts to “cases” and “controversies.”235 The purpose of this limitation is to
preserve the separation of powers by restricting those “cases” and “controversies”
to those “which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”236 As the
USSC observed, “the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging
part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”237

235. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
236. Id. at 560 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
237. Id. at 560 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
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1. Requirements for Standing238
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court set forth the requirements for
standing holding that:
[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical.”’ Second there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be ‘fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third,
it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will
be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’239
Standing “limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in
federal court to seek redress for legal wrong.”240 Injury in fact is “the first and
foremost” of standing’s three elements.241
a. Injury-in-fact
The injury must be “particularized,” meaning that it “must affect the plaintiff
in a personal and individual way.”242 The injury must also be concrete, meaning
that it must “be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.”243 The court in Spokeo
was careful to distinguish “particularized” from “concrete.”244
However, it must be emphasized that even though the plaintiff must allege a
“distinct and palpable injury to himself,” it can be “an injury shared by a large class
of other possible litigants.”245
But, as Professor Kevin Culp Davis observed, “injuries that suffice for
standing are often trivial . . . .” 246 Professor Davis characterized common law

238. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751. In addition to the constitutional minimum of standing listed,
there is also a set of “several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches; and the requirement that a plaintiff’s
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”
239. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–561 (citations and dashes omitted) (emphasis added).
240. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (citations omitted).
241. Id. at 1547 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).
242. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
243. Id.
244. Id. (“When we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the
term ‘real,’ not ‘abstract.’ (citation omitted) Concreteness, therefore, is quite different from particularization.”).
245. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)
246. Kevin Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 612 (1968).
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actions sounding in trespass, battery, or assault as requiring only a trifling injury
to vindicate a principle.247 He then characterizes suits against a public officer or
the government in the same way—asserting that they may also be based on a trifle
as the basis for standing to assert a principle.248 But Professor Davis notes that even
though “standing may rest upon a trifle, it is equally clear that a trifling interest of
the plaintiff is always required.”249
The rationale for asserting that standing may be based on a trifle is to avoid
any Tom, Dick, or Harry from raising “in court any question about the legality of
governmental action which affects the public, even though the plaintiff does not
allege that he is adversely affected by the governmental action he seeks to
challenge.”250 In other words, standing will not lie if the objective of the plaintiff’s
action is merely to uphold “a general interest common to all members of the
public.”251
b. Injury-in-fact in § 1365a
As injury-in-fact is the “first and foremost” of standing’s three elements, it is
also the most challenging requirement for the proposed statute to fulfill.
Essentially, the injury-in-fact that provides the basis for the application of the draft
statute is the deprivation of information that would frustrate a properly qualified §
501(c)(3) from fulfilling its objectives as defined in § 1365a(g)(1).
If the § 501(c)(3) organization is not able to challenge the President’s
invocation of executive privilege by seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief, then it cannot fulfill its multi-pronged purposes of promoting integrity,
transparency, and accountability of government in the context described in the
proposed legislation. Moreover, the statute could not be invoked unless and until
the Congress adopted a resolution of contempt ?against the executive branch
following the President’s assertion of executive privilege and the executive
branch’s corresponding refusal to comply with Congress’s subpoena for
information, testimony, or both.
An additional harm to the organization would lie in its inability to inform the
citizenry of its efforts and to report on the results of its litigation to challenge the

247. Id. at 613 (“If A steps on B’s land, touches B’s person, or points a gun at B, in each instance causing
damage or injury so trifling that is not discernible, B nevertheless has a cause of action for trespass, battery, or
assault. The common law in each instance allows for the plaintiff, on the basis of the trifle, to assert principle.”).
248. See Davis, supra note 246, at 613.
249. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
250. Id. at 614.
251. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (citing Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 624
(1937)); see also id. at 574–75 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government – claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large – does not state an Article III case or controversy.”).
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validity of the executive privilege claim. The public outreach function is crucial to
promoting a more informed public—another of the draft statute’s purposes.
c. Cases Supporting Standing of an Appropriately Qualified § 501(c)(3)
Organization
Several cases have found standing based on an organization’s inability to carry
out its mission because of the executive branch’s refusal to provide certain
information. All of the cases discussed below focus on the need of public interest
organizations to obtain information from the government without which they
cannot fulfill their stated purposes.
(i) Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Commission (Radiation Risks)
Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. (SIPI) was a public interest
group whose purposes included: (a) providing scientific information to the public
that was relevant to important social issues and (b) effectuating its purposes of
“stimulating and informing” public discussion of the scientific aspects of public
policy questions.252
The court held that SIPI had standing to sue253 the former Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) because the AEC’s failure to file a mandated Environmental
Impact Report (EIR) on a planned reactor program adversely affected SIPI’s ability
to fulfill its purposes.254 That adverse effect—not having the information with
which to inform the public—constituted the required harm to demonstrate
standing.255
Since NEPA did not authorize a private right of action,256 SIPI brought its suit
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) which does provide for judicial
review of agency action and accords federal courts jurisdiction over NEPA
challenges under the APA.257

252. Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (1973).
253. Id.
254. Id.; see § 102(2)(C) of NEPA; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) required that federal agencies prepare an EIR for every major action that would significantly affect the
quality of the human environment.
255. Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (1973).
256. See Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1988).
257. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06. Notably, however, the APA does not permit “an action directly against the
President” for two reasons: (1) Since the APA neither explicitly includes or excludes the President, “the act should
be construed to exclude the President ‘out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional
position of the President.’” Corus Grp. PLC v. ITC, 352 F.3d 1351, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (2000)); and (2) “Actions of the President cannot be reviewed under the APA
because the President is not an ‘agency’ under that Act.” Corus Group PLV, 352 F.3d at 1359 (citing Dalton v.
Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994)).
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(ii) Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (Housing Discrimination)
In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, the USSC found standing for a non-profit
organization whose purpose was to “make equal opportunity in housing a reality
in the Richmond [Virginia] Metropolitan Area.”258 The organization’s ability to
fulfill this objective by providing counselling and referral services to low- and
moderate-income home seekers was “perceptibly impaired” by a real estate
corporation’s racial steering practices.259
In Havens, an African American seeking rental housing was told that none was
available (when it was) and a member of the organization, who was also African
American, was falsely told the same thing.260 The two individuals and the
organization, itself, sued Havens for housing discrimination under § 812 of
the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).261
The USSC found that “Congress has thus conferred on all ‘persons’ a legal
right to truthful information about available housing.”262 Additionally, the Court
stated that, “The sole requirement for standing to sue under §812 [of the FHA] is
the Art. III minima of injury in fact: that the plaintiff allege that as a result of the
defendant’s actions he has suffered ‘a distinct and palpable injury.’”263
The injury claimed by the organization was that its clients were deprived “of
their right to the important social, professional, business and economic, political
and aesthetic benefits of interracial associations that arise from living in integrated
communities free from discriminatory housing practices.”264 The USSC found that
the corporation’s conduct caused “concrete and demonstrable injury” to the
organization’s activities and served as a drain on its resources and constituted “far
more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”265

258. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman. 455 U.S. 363, 379, 382 (1982).
259. Id. at 379.
[R]acial steering’ is a ‘practice by which real estate brokers and agents preserve and encourage patterns
of racial segregation in available housing by steering members of racial and ethnic groups to buildings
occupied primarily by members of such racial and ethnic groups and away from buildings and
neighborhoods inhabited primarily by members of other races or groups.
Id. at 366 n.1.
260. Id. at 368.
261. Id. at 366–67. The FHA made it unlawful for an individual or firm covered by the Act, “to represent
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for
inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” See id. at 373 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)).
262. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. at 373.
263. Id. at 372 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
264. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. at 376 (citation omitted).
265. Id. at 379.
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(iii) Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler (Age
Discrimination)
The purposes of the Action Alliance for Senior Citizens (AASC) included
improving the lives of elderly citizens by providing informational, counselling,
referral, and other services.266 To provide these services, the AASC depended upon
information that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had
provided. That information enabled the AASC to identify programs that were
possibly engaged in age discrimination. All federal programs providing financial
assistance had been required to provide proof of their compliance with the Age
Discrimination Act (ADA) by listing all of the age distinctions they used as well
as the justification for them.267
As a result of certain HHS regulatory actions to implement the ADA,
information that Congress intended to be made routinely available was now not
required to be disclosed.268 Under regulations approved by the HHS Secretary, that
requirement was made voluntary.269 Without this information, the AASC claimed
that it was impeded in its efforts to combat age discrimination by being able to
monitor federal agency compliance with the ADA270
The court found that the information to which AASC would have had access
had HHS adhered to the requirements of the ADA, was a resource useful in the
AASC’s daily counselling and referral work.271 The court further found that
“AASC’s counselling and referral activities are inhibited by the absence of the
information” previously required, “and that [the] inhibition is . . . real and causes
. . . hardship.”272 Accordingly, the court found that AASC had standing to raise its
claims.273
(iv) FEC v. Akins (Political Disclosure Requirements)
James E. Akins and a number of other former ambassadors, congressmen, and
government officials were politically active persons opposed to the American
Israeli Political Action Committee’s [AIPAC] “views on U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East.”274 Akins and other plaintiffs had unsuccessfully petitioned the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) under the Federal Election Campaign Act

266. Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 935 (1986).
267. Id. This requirement was termed as the self-evaluation provision by the court.
268. Id. at 935.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 937. (“[T]he elimination of the self-evaluation requirement and the reduction of compliance
reports – significantly restrict” the flow of information regarding services available to the elderly).
271. Id. at 941.
272. Heckler, 789 F.2d at 942.
273. Id. at 944.
274. Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
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(Act), 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. to find that the AIPAC was a “political committee.”275
The Act permits anyone who contends that a violation of the Act has occurred to
file a complaint with the FEC.276 The Act also allows any party who is aggrieved
by an FEC order dismissing a complaint filed by that party to petition the district
court.277 In addition to those provisions, the Act contains monetary limits on
campaign contribution to and expenditures on behalf of candidates for federal
office as well as record keeping and disclosure requirements for the purpose of
preventing political corruption.278 The reporting requirements are imposed on
groups that fall within the Act’s definition of “political committees.”279 Those
reporting requirements mandate that a political committee must make public its list
of donors.280 An FEC decision finding that the AIPAC was a political committee
would obligate it to comply with those reporting requirements. The plaintiffs
sought to compel the AIPAC to disclose to the FEC all of the information required
by the Act for “political committees.”281
The USSC held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, finding that they had
suffered an injury-in-fact based on their inability to obtain information—the list of
AIPAC donors and related campaign contributions and expenditures.282 The high
court held that, “there is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would
help them (and others to whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates
for public office, especially candidates who received assistance from AIPAC, and
to evaluate the role that AIPAC’s financial assistance might play in a specific
election.”283 Integral to its holding, the Court also found that plaintiffs’ injury was
concrete and particular.284
As these four cases illustrate, courts have recognized a doctrine known as
“informational standing,” which permits a party “to sue in federal court to force
the government to provide information to the public (and thereby to it) if the
government’s failure to provide or cause others to provide that particular
information specially affects that party.”285 An additional caveat for the application
of “informational standing” is that the “failure must impinge on the plaintiff’s daily
operations or make normal operations infeasible in order to create injury-in-

275. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 18 (1998) (reviewing the District Court’s granting of summary
judgment for the FEC after FEC’s dismissal of administrative complaint; a divided panel of the Court of Appeals
affirmed; while the en banc Court of Appeals reversed, but on the ground that FEC had misinterpreted the Act’s
definition of “political committee”).
276. Id. at 19.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 14.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 14–15.
281. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. at 16.
282. Id. at 21.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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fact.”286
Each of the four organizations that sued the government had very similar
purposes—public information, outreach, and advocacy. All of them worked to
fight against various societal ills—the dangers of radiation (SIPI), housing
discrimination (Havens Realty), age discrimination (AASC), and political
corruption (Akins). The failure of the government to provide the necessary
information for these organizations constituted injuries in fact and impinged on
their daily operations or made those operations infeasible. There is no doubt that
the government’s failing to provide or withholding of the needed information
caused the injury-in-fact in each case. It is also clear that the government’s
providing the necessary information could have redressed each of these injuries.
Therefore, it is clear—and the respective courts so held—that each of the
organizations had informational standing. It is important to point out that each
organization sued under a specific statute. SIPI filed its claim under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA); Havens Realty sued under the Fair Housing
Act (FHA); AASC sued under both the Age Discrimination Act (ADA); and Akins
asserted a violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
The proposed statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1365a et seq. would permit an eligible
§ 501(c)(3) organization to bring its action requesting a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief in a similar way to that used in SIPI, Havens Realty, AASC, and
Akins. Just as those organizations demonstrated injury-in-fact based on the
deprivation of information those organizations to achieve their stated purposes, an
eligible § 501(c)(3) could establish its standing in the same manner.
There, however, is an important difference between the outcomes sought by
each of the four organizations discussed above and that contemplated under the
draft statute for the eligible §501(c)(3) organizations. The four organizations
prevail only if they obtain the previously undisclosed information. Under the draft
statute, however, the organization fulfills its principal purpose by the district court
conducting a hearing—regardless of the outcome. In evaluating the invocation of
executive privilege, the district court has a right to review all the information for
which the privilege is claimed. If in conducting that review, the district court
determines that the privilege is properly asserted, then it may decide not to disclose
any of the information subpoenaed by Congress. If on the other hand, the district
court determines that the privilege is not properly claimed, then it could decide to
disclose the subpoenaed information. In either event, the § 501(c)(3) organization
achieves the primary purposes set forth in § 1365a(g)(1).
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Article addressed the invocation of executive privilege by the President
to congressional subpoenas and Congress’s adopting contempt resolutions in

286. Id. (citation omitted).
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response. Historically, Congress has adopted three possible courses of action after
the contempt resolution is adopted to obtain compliance with its subpoenas and
orders.287 Each has been rather unproductive. The best examples of Congressional
inaction can be seen in the aftermath of the contempt resolutions Congress
approved for former AGs Eric Holder and William Barr as well as Commerce
Secretary Ross. Congress held each in contempt after the President had invoked
executive privilege.288 However, the subpoenaed information was never produced
and the clock ran out on each Administration, permitting the executive branch to
poke a metaphorical finger in Congress’ eye.
The first of the three alternatives that Congress has pursued to respond to
contumacious witnesses was using its inherent contempt authority, and—
following a trial-like proceeding and after conviction—ordering the imprisonment
of the contemnor until they comply.289 But the imprisonment is limited to the
length of the congressional session.290This procedure was in use generally between
1795 and 1857.291
The second approach was enacted in reaction to the relative impotence of the
first—seeking prosecution of the contemnor by the USA under 2 U.S.C. §§ 192
and 194 (adopted in 1857), which makes the offense a misdemeanor and currently
punishable by up to a year in prison and a $100,000 fine.292 But this alternative
relies upon the willingness of the USA to prosecute, which—as a practical
matter—since the USA and the President are of the same party, they will virtually
never do if the contemnor is an executive branch employee or officer.
The third vehicle used by Congress to enforce its subpoenas is by filing a civil
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1365 which aims at compliance and not
punishment.293 The civil enforcement approach emanated out of the Watergate
crisis in the form of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, but to obtain passage,
the statute excluded executive branch officials from its ambit.294 Ironically then,
the very nugget of the problem—executive branch obstinacy—is left unredressed
and unredressable under the statute. If the objective sought in a civil action is
compliance and not punishment for contempt, then the general mechanism of the
statute seems potentially useful but excluding executive branch officials currently
severely constrains the general mechanism.
This Article presented a substantial modification of § 1365, that—instead of
relying upon Congress to litigate the validity of its subpoenas or order—vests the
287. Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1.
288. Memorandum from Carolyn B. Maloney, Acting Chairwoman, House of Representatives Committee
on Oversight and Reform to all Committee members, November 12, 12019 (Maloney Memorandum),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/20193
289. Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 1.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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authority to seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in private, non-profit,
and tax-exempt organizations with § 501(c)(3) status. These organizations would
be required to meet certain eligibility requirements which are stated in §
1365a(g)(1).
There are many such § 501(c)(3) organizations, both on the political right and
the left which would be more than willing to tackle these issues. But the obvious
question requiring addressing is whether such organizations would be able to
demonstrate standing.
This Article then discussed four cases in which public advocacy organizations
sued the government for information necessary for each organization to achieve its
stated purposes. In each of these cases the Court found that the organizations had
informational standing. Under the doctrine of informational standing, a party could
sue in federal court to force the government to provide information to the public
and the organization if the government’s failure to provide it caused harm to the
organization—harm that would impede the organization’s daily operations or
make them infeasible.
In demonstrating standing, the § 501(c)(3) organizations must also show that
they meet the two primary purpose requirements as expressed in § 1365a(g)(1).
The first purpose requires the organizations to use their public advocacy,
litigation, and monitoring efforts to seek declaratory judgements and injunctive
relief, where necessary to achieve executive branch compliance with
Congressional subpoenas or orders when the President has invoked executive
privilege and Congress has adopted a contempt resolution in response to the
executive branch’s refusal to comply with Congress’s demand. Achievement of
this objective would substantially advance the goal of restoring constitutional
limits on the executive branch’s power.
The second principal purpose that these organizations must fulfill is that they
must conduct an ongoing study of the interrelationship between the Congress and
the executive branch emphasizing the situation in which a contempt resolution has
been adopted by either House of Congress in response to the President’s invocation
of executive privilege and the executive branch’s continued refusal to comply with
Congress’s subpoenas or orders. The results of these studies would be maintained
in a historical archive which would be updated annually, contain transcripts of any
hearings conducted under the proposed statute as well as any pleadings filed as
part of those hearings, and copies of any declaratory judgments and injunctions
ordered by the district court. The archive would also be maintained in electronic
form for online access by the public and the organization’s members.
The 225-year history of frustrated Congressional efforts to respond to
contumacious witnesses illustrates that the most significant obstacle to reform
occurs in one situation. That obstacle occurs when Congress adopts a contempt
resolution after the President has invoked executive privilege and the executive
branch continues its refusal to comply with Congress’s subpoenas or orders. While
the occurrences in which Congress has adopted contempt resolutions against
executive branch employees and officers were virtually non-existent between 1792
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and the 1980’s, our political atmosphere has become substantially more toxic,
resulting in many more Congressional contempt resolutions. Some of those
resolutions have been adopted in response to the increasingly greater number of
executive branch officers who have—at the direction of the President—asserted
executive privilege. While still not a large number, the lack of any effective and
expeditious Congressional action amidst the continued assertion of executive
privilege—regardless of the political party of the contemnors—cries out for a
remedy. The proposed statute provides one such remedy.
The proposed statute would remedy all the deficiencies of § 1365 by
mandating that it applies not only to the general public but also to all executive
branch employees and officers—particularly including both the President and the
Vice-President. Moreover, the proposed statute would require the expeditious
handling of the litigation at both the trial and the appellate levels, would not
supplant Congressional efforts under existing law, and would provide for the
punishment of non-compliance in a summary proceeding tried before the court
with the imposition of sanctions as determined by the district court.
Most importantly, there would be far fewer delays in the application of the
draft statute than there have been with § 1365. While the motivation for any §
501(c)(3) organization to file a civil action under the proposed statute might be
prompted by political considerations, IRS regulations would limit the number of
political activities that these organizations could engage in under the potential
penalty of the loss of their tax-exempt status. To minimize the amount of litigation
that could occur should such draft legislation be enacted, the civil actions
authorized under the statute could be filed if, and only if, Congress has first adopted
a contempt resolution under the circumstances described above. Finally, the
contempt resolution would serve as the trigger point for the filing of civil actions
as contemplated under the proposed statute.
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